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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Thanks to the advent of the Internet, it is now possible to easily share vast amounts of electronic 
information and computer resources (which include hardware, computer services, etc.) in open 
distributed environments. These environments serve as a common platform for heterogeneous 
users (e.g., corporate, individuals etc.) by hosting customized user applications and systems [Díaz-
López, 2015], providing ubiquitous access to the shared resources and requiring less 
administrative efforts; as a result, they enable users and companies to increase their productivity. 
Specifically, in recent years, open on-line environments such as Online Social Networks 
(OSNs) or the Cloud have attracted billions of users willing to share online resources and 
outsource data and computation [Boyd, 2007]. On the one hand, OSNs provide users with a 
common platform for social interaction based on their mutual interests and activities [Al-garadi, 
2016], which is based onsharing digital information (e.g. photos, videos, text, profile data, etc). On 
the other hand, cloud computing has attracted many business organizations and end users due to its 
minimal management effort, maintenance cost and ubiquitous access of outsourced resources, 
which can be hardware or software [Younis, 2014]. These resources are shared in a large-scale 
distributed environment among the users of a computer network over the Internet [Bayramusta, 
2016].  
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Unfortunately, sharing of resources in open environments has significantly increased the 
privacy threats to the users to whom the data refer to. Indeed, shared electronic data may be 
exploited by third parties, such as Data Brokers [Ramirez, 2014], which may aggregate, infer and 
redistribute (sensitive) personal features, thus potentially impairing the privacy of the individuals 
[Viejo, 2013]. Because of the potential confidentiality of many of the shared resources and data, 
ensuring the right to privacy of individuals has emerged as a main concern for data controllers, 
organizations and end users [Onn, 2005], and privacy protection in these environments has been 
considered as a challenging research problem [Ali, 2015, Bayramusta, 2016]. 
A way to palliate this problem consists on controlling the access of users over the potentially 
sensitive resources. Specifically, access control management regulates the access to the shared 
resources according to the credentials of the users, the type of resource and the privacy preferences 
of the resource/data owners [Ferraiolo, 2007]. Within this context, delegation of access control is 
also needed to transfer users’ access rights to other entities on a particular resource in order to 
increase the flexibility of the access management and to reduce the administrative load in large 
scale scenarios. 
The efficient management of access control is crucial in large and dynamic environments such 
as the ones described above. In the current literature, researchers have proposed several solutions 
[Blanc, 2013, Coyne, 2013, Zamite, 2013] that rely on basic access control models [Hu, 2014], 
such as discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access control model (MAC), role-based 
access model (RBAC) or attribute access control model (ABAC). Most of these solutions are 
mainly based on priori and manually managed policies/rules specified for concrete entities and 
resources. These approaches are usually enough to manage users’ access rights in closed 
environments, such as static organizations, which involve a limited number of entities and 
resources, and for which a manual management of access rules is feasible. However, manually 
managing privacy rules and access constraints in open environment, such as OSNs or the cloud, is 
not practical due to the following reasons: 
(i) A large number of entities need to be managed. For example, Google Drive has 
billions of users and each user manages several types of resources. 
(ii) The heterogeneous entities involved in these scenarios would likely have diverse 
privacy requirements. For example, for a cloud provider offering storage space, an 
organization involving employees, departments and resources would define 
significantly different privacy requirements than casual end-users. 
(iii) The dynamicity and openness of such scenarios make the privacy requirements to 
change rapidly with respect to the type of services and users. 
 
Moreover, many of the access control solutions proposed in the literature are ineffective for 
end users willing to manage the access to their sensitive information due to the following issues: i) 
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the rigidness of the access control mechanism [Johnson, 2012], and ii) many users lack of 
technical knowledge about data privacy and access control [Liu, 2011]. Furthermore, in most 
access control mechanisms, there is a proportional decrease in performance as the number of 
entities involved in the process increase, which is problematic in large environments because of 
the number of entities to be managed. Thus, there is a need to develop generic access control 
solutions that scale well in large environments and that are able to overcome the above mentioned 
limitations. 
1.2 Goals 
To tackle the privacy challenges related to the exchange of data and resources in open 
environments via appropriate access control mechanisms, we define the following goals for this 
thesis:  
• To study the state of the art on access control management, with a special focus on 
large and dynamic open environments. More specifically, we will study mechanisms 
to formally model the entities involved in access control management as a mean to 
alleviate the administrative efforts of manual management. 
• To propose a generic access control mechanism that models the entities involved in 
access control and their interrelationships, which could be easily adapted to open 
environments. With this, we aim at providing the means to greatly simplify and 
speed up the definition of rules in complex scenarios and improve the 
interoperability between heterogeneous settings. 
• To propose delegation enforcement mechanism for distributed open environments 
that automatically performs delegation, revocation and verification of access rights 
in an efficient manner. 
• Access control should be driving the disclosure risks of the resources and this 
disclosure is caused by their (potentially sensitive) contents, we also aim at propose 
an automatic content and privacy-driven access control mechanism specially 
tailored to protect the sensitive resources published in open social environments. 
This will make the protection of sensitive resources transparent and alleviate the 
effort required to manually definite access control rules on specific resources. 
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
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1.3 Overview of this document 
The rest of the document is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 presents the background of the work, discussing the need for privacy protection 
of sensitive resources and the main mechanisms available to enforce privacy, with a 
specific focus on access control. The main access control management models are also 
discussed. Finally, ontologies are introduced as knowledge representation formalisms 
suitable to model and manage access control entities and interrelationships in open 
environments. 
• Chapter 3 surveys and discusses works that aim at offering solutions to the problems 
faced by standard access control models in large-scale open environments. The state of the 
art is classified in ontology-based and non-ontology-based models and their main benefits 
and limitations are highlighted. Works are finally compared according to the desirable 
factors that contribute to improve the management of access control. 
• Chapter 4 presents a generic access control management ontology that can be easily 
extended for specific environments. The proposed solution simplifies the definition and 
enforcement of rules due to the automatic ontology-based inference of rules. To 
demonstrate its applicability and benefits, this ontology is applied to two large and open 
scenarios i.e., OSNs and the Cloud. 
• Chapter 5 elaborates important aspects of delegation of access control management in 
large and dynamic scenarios. It discusses the challenges of existing solutions and how they 
can be resolved through the ontology-based approach we propose. It also states how the 
processes of delegation, revocation and verification of access rights can be improved 
through the proposed algorithms.  
• Chapter 6 presents a content and privacy-driven access control mechanism that is able to 
automatically define access rules on sensitive resources according to disclosure risks 
inherent to their contents and the privacy requirements of the owner. This solution is 
especially suitable for open social media scenarios, such as OSNs. 
• Chapter 7 contains the summary of the work, highlights its main contributions, and 
depicts some lines for future work.       
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Chapter 2 Background
 
2.1 Privacy 
Privacy protection in an act that permit an individual or a group to define access boundaries 
around her private domain in order to manage public access according to the privacy requirements 
of their choice [Marcella, 2003]. This private domain may include information related to an 
individual/corporate or any tangible resource that needs protection from unwanted access. 
According to Solove [Solove, 2008], the concepts of privacy can be (i) access to the personal 
information, (ii) right to be alone, (iii) control on others to use one’s information or (iv) option to 
conceal any information from others. 
Several legislations regulate the notion of privacy of the individuals and the need to protect 
their private domain. In this respect, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) [Onn, 2005] proclaims that the right to privacy of individuals is essential and needs to be 
practiced. Likewise, current legislations on privacy, such as the EU Data Protection Act [EU, 
1995], U.S. laws on medical data privacy [DoHNY, 2013] and the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [HIPAA, 1996], regulate which information is private and how it 
should be protected. Specifically, article 8 of the EU Data Protection Act [EU, 1995] declares 
personal data such as medical health, religion, race, politics, membership of past organizations 
and sexuality are sensitive and mandates that the information related to these topics cannot be 
uncontrollably released without the consent of the user. On the other hand, U.S. laws on medical 
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
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data privacy [DoHNY, 2013] defines diseases such as HIV, hepatitis, sexually transmitted diseases 
as sensitive topics and potential sources of discrimination (e.g., in legal claims for workers’ 
compensation claims) that should only be accessible to authorized parties. Moreover, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [HIPAA, 1996] states safe harbor rules 
about the kind of personally identifiable information that should be removed in medical 
documents prior making them available to third parties; specifically it requires 18 data elements 
(called PHI: Protected Health Information), such as health information (which includes health 
status, provision of health care, or payment for health care) and census features (such as names, 
locations, phone numbers, etc.), to be protected. 
The scientific community has proposed several methods to ensure the right to privacy of the 
individuals, which include, but are not limited to, the following methodologies: (i) cryptography, 
(ii) data anonymization, and (iii) access control management.  
Cryptography is a mathematical technique that fully masks digital data to keep it secret, so that 
only authorized entities with the appropriate cryptographic material (i.e., decryption keys) may 
have access to the clear data. Symmetric key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography are 
commonly used techniques. In symmetric cryptography, the key is common for both parties (i.e., 
sender and receiver) that is used for encryption and decryption of data. On the other hand, 
asymmetric cryptography operates on two keys, in which, one key (i.e., public key) is shared 
publically that is used for encryption and private key is used for decryption of data. Key 
management in the crypto-system is a real challenge, since the privacy of a set of individuals may 
be compromised if key is revealed [Rivest, 1978]. 
On the other hand, data anonymization seeks at removing or masking personal identifiable 
information related to the individuals from the publically shared data [Viejo, 2012, Martínez, 
2013, Soria-Comas, 2015, Sánchez, 2016b]. In comparison to cryptography, data anonymization is 
irreversible and, thus, it does not require from managing secret materials (e.g., 
encryption/decryption keys). Moreover, contrary to cipher texts, anonymized data still retain some 
analytical utility, which is useful for research purposes, but that makes it impossible to guarantee a 
perfect privacy protection (i.e., some information is still being leaked). Some of the areas of 
research for data anonymization are statistical disclosure control [Hundepool, 2012] and privacy 
preserving data publishing [Domingo-Ferrer, 2016]. 
Finally, access control management regulates the authorization on shared sensitive resources 
according to the level of trust of the users. In access control management, access rights of the 
users are defined along with their level of access on the digital resources (see the next section for 
further details).  
Encryption and anonymization are useful to protect data that is uncontrollably exchanged to 
third parties in open environments but, in environments with central authorities in which users are 
authenticated and associated to user credentials, access control is a more convenient alternative 
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that does not modify data (so that information is perfectly preserved for authorized users), but just 
controls the access on them. Moreover, cryptography and data anonymization only deal with 
digital data, but access control can also manage the access to computing resources in addition to 
the digital content. Finally, access control management is an essential element to most information 
technologies in order to limit unwanted access to digital resources (e.g., business applications, 
social networks, cloud, etc). The following subsection details several aspects of access control and 
its applications. 
2.2 Access Control 
The management of access rights implies granting or denying access to a specific resource 
according to (i) the credentials of the users, (ii) the type of the resource and (iii) the privacy 
requirements of the resource owner [Imran-Daud, 2016a]. Access control systems rely on three 
basic building blocks in order to manage the access [Hu, 2006]:  
 
(i) An access control policy that specifies how to manage access and who is eligible to 
access specific information/resource. 
(ii) A mechanism that grants or denies access by examining the access request and 
enforces access policies accordingly.  
(iii) A model that is enforced by the system and it is a formal presentation of the security 
policy that illustrates the methods to handle specific conditions when users try to 
access system resources. 
 
Two well-known access control models that are used to manage security policies are: (i) 
discretionary access control (DAC) and (ii) mandatory access control (MAC). In DAC, access 
control is at the discretion of the resource owner or anyone who is authorized to control the access 
on the resources. In such model, access is restricted according to the identity of the users. On the 
other hand, MAC-based systems do not rely on the owner of the resource to take authorization 
decisions, but on the central authority that handles access requests and takes access decisions 
according to the rules that are defined for the entities of the system. These two models are the 
basis for several other models that have been proposed for different environments, which are 
discussed later in this section. 
Access control management is essential for collaborative scenario dealing with sensitive data 
and/or resources, but it is more challenging in large scale open on-line environments due to large 
number of heterogeneous users and resources to manage. For example, in social networks, users 
publically share huge amount of content such as messages, profile data, or social apps that may 
contain sensitive information and may constitute a serious privacy issue, thus requiring proper 
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access control management. To manage access control in a large scale environment, system 
designers have offered several models but two widely used generic models are: role-based access 
control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC). These two models are more scalable 
(in terms of number of users), flexible (easy to implement in large environments) and convenient 
to manage than DAC and MAC models, because they refer to roles and attributes rather than 
relying on individual users to manage access control. Details of these models are explained in the 
following subsection. 
2.2.1 RBAC and ABAC Models 
In RBAC, access rights are managed through the roles of the users defined for specific 
resources, over which either MAC or DAC can be implemented to manage access rights. To 
model RBAC, Sandhu et al. [Sandhu, 1996] proposed four sub models:  
 
(i) RBAC0 (known as flat RBAC) specifies the users of a domain, their permissions to 
access resources and the sessions, and manipulates them through the roles of the users 
in order to manage access control.  
(ii) RBAC1 (known as hierarchical RBAC) introduces role hierarchies over RBAC0. 
These hierarchies represent the organizational structure of the authorities, in which 
former roles manage their subsequent roles and authenticate them during an access 
request. For example, the project manager of any department in an organization is at 
the top of the role hierarchy with full access privileges over the subsequent project 
leaders that have limited access privileges inherited by the project leader. Engineers 
are at the last level of the hierarchy with the roles specific to their jobs that are 
allocated by the project leaders. 
(iii) RBAC2 (known as constrained RBAC) incorporates constraints in addition to RBAC0. 
These constraints add conditions to the roles in order to limit privileges and to 
introduce the notion of separation of duties according to the users’ roles. For example, 
in an account department, a constraint can be defined on the role of billing users to 
refrain her to access account receivable records.  
(iv) Finally, RBAC3 (known as symmetric RBAC) combines RBAC1 and RBAC2 
capabilities, which provides constrains on the role hierarchies. In RBAC-based 
systems, access decisions are made according to the roles assigned beforehand to the 
users of a system. Roles represent the privileges the user have or tasks they are 
permitted to perform within the system.  
 
On the other hand, the ABAC model [Hu, 2014], which can also be implemented with DAC or 
MAC, relies on the attributes of the entities of the system to manage the access rights (e.g., 
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attributes of system users and resources). For example, project managers (defined as an attribute) 
can view records of employees of their respective departments. ABAC-based systems process 
access requests by examining attributes of the subjects (i.e., system users) and the objects (i.e., 
system resources) against the policy defined by the owner of resource. The attributes of the subject 
and object are managed locally in the repository that is managed by the system. The policy 
contains rules that are used to take authorization decisions and these rules are determined from the 
policy once the attributes are validated.  
The core modules of the ABAC mechanism are the policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy 
decision point (PDP). PEP is responsible to process access requests of the user, invoke PDP and 
take authorization decisions based on the input of the PDP. On the other hand, the PDP takes 
authorization decisions based on the attributes of the subject, objects and rules defined for them.  
In general, ABAC is better than RBAC in terms of scalability (i.e., number of users to be 
managed), flexibility (i.e., easier to implement in a large scale environment) and access control 
management (i.e., it is easier to associate attributes to other users or resources) [Priebe, 2006, 
Coyne, 2013]. Moreover, ABAC-based solutions are more efficient than RBAC-based solutions 
due to the following reasons: (i) ABAC does not require manual management of multiple roles 
(i.e., access roles and delegated roles) for entities of the system; and (ii) a single policy can be 
referred to multiple users in order to avoid the burden of multiple roles management for users 
sharing a common resource. 
Researchers have also contributed to minimize the access control management burden by 
proposing several solutions relying on these models (i.e. RBAC and ABAC).These include 
classifying resources into categories [Cheng, 2012b], itemizing data into different elements 
[Aïmeur, 2010] or classifying users into lists (e.g., blacklist users) [Cramer, 2015]. However, these 
methods do not scale well in large and complex environments because of: (i) the growing privacy 
configuration requirements and the incapability of existing solutions to handle them in an efficient 
manner [Beato, 2009]; and (ii) the burden of the definition and management of rules and policies 
by users and administrators [Daud, 2015]. 
2.3 Delegation of Access control 
In addition to standard access control tasks, delegation of access rights is another important 
aspect of access control management. By means of delegation, a user can delegate her access 
rights or privileges to other users, which is useful (i) for efficient management of access control in 
distributed environment (e.g., cloud, distributed databases etc), and (ii) to reduce the 
administrative burden of the owners of resource.  
In the delegation process, a user is referred to as a delegator provided she holds access 
privileges on a specific resource and is legally empowered to exercise her right to delegate these 
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privileges. On the other hand, the recipient of the delegation is referred to as delegatee. During the 
delegation process, the delegator defines scope and limitations of delegation that restrict the 
delegatee to exercise her inherited privileges under specific limitations. These terms are can be in 
the form of roles or policies depending on the access control model type.  
  Delegation is a proxy process that enables delegatee to perform specific tasks on behalf of the 
delegators [Pham, 2010]. For this purpose, it requires a reliable mechanism that supports these 
tasks and it must also address the following queries while processing a user’s access request for a 
resource:  
(i) Does a user has intended access privileges on a resource? 
(ii) Is a delegator legitimate that granted access privileges to the user? 
(iii) Does a delegator hold privileges that are delegated to the user? 
To support such these tasks, researchers have proposed several mechanisms that rely on 
different standards(e.g., [Joshi, 2004]), being the XACML delegation profile [OASIS, 2013] 
[XACML-Profile, 2009] the most widely used standard. The advantages of the XACML are:(i) the 
policies can be written and analyzed independent of the specific environment [OASIS, 2013], (ii) 
administrators only need to describe access control policy once, (iii) it can accommodate 
dynamically changing access control policy requirements, (iv) a single policy can serve several 
entities at a time. This standard is briefly discussed in the following subsection. 
2.3.1 XACML and the XACML Delegation Profile 
XACML [OASIS, 2013] defines an access control policy language that is implemented in XML 
and provides an intuitive way to evaluate access requests according to the rules defined in the 
policies. Moreover, it provides a common terminology and enables interoperability among 
vendors that implement access control. XACML is an ABAC-based standard, even though it can 
also implement RBAC as a specialization of ABAC by using attributes of the entities for access 
control management.  
XACML is structured into three basic elements: policy set, policy and rule.  The owner of a 
resource manages the access control by specifying policies for several users. Policies that are 
defined for a common resource are managed in a policy set. Access control on a resource is 
managed by defining rules that are encompassed within a policy. Table 2.1 shows the actors 
modeled by XACML that are involved in the process of managing an access request for a resource 
and their architecture is shown in figure 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Actors of XACML 
Actors Description 
Policy 
Administration 
Point (PAP) 
Repository for policies and serves policies to PDP 
Policy 
Decision Point 
(PDP) 
Takes access decision based on the access request 
and also collects related data from other actors.   
Policy 
Enforcement 
Point (PEP) 
It is interface to the requestor and the internal 
actors of the system. It processes request and 
response. 
Policy 
Information 
Point (PIP) 
Retrieves and evaluates attributes of the entities. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Architecture of XACML actors [OASIS, 2013] 
In addition to access control, delegation of access rights is also implemented in the XACML 
profile [XACML-Profile, 2009]. Delegation allows users to transfer their access rights to other 
entities on a particular resource [Wang, 2008]. In the XACML profile, access rights on the 
resources are delegated in the form of policies. Moreover, reduction is a process that is performed 
to validate the authenticity of the issuer of the policy. For this purpose, a graph of policies is 
generated as a result of each access request for a resource, which contains the hierarchy of the 
delegated policies. To generate a policy graph, the attributes of the access request are searched 
(i.e. the delegatee and requested resource) within the policy delegated to the requester and, then, 
edges between that policy and its delegated policy nodes are created by matching the attributes of 
the entities within the hierarchy of the delegated policies (attributes are the delegatee and its 
delegator). Then, the path of the graph, which connects the owner of a resource and the requester 
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with all the intermediate delegators, is checked in order to verify the authenticity of the delegated 
policy of the requester. As a result, decisions are made in the form of permit or deny access to the 
resource.  
 
Figure 2.2 XACML delegation graph[XACML-Profile, 2009] 
In this approach, the method to evaluate an access request, that is, generating a policy graph 
and finding attributes within all policies for each access request, is a costly solution in terms of 
performance. Figure 2.2 illustrates a sample graph generated as a result of access request. The 
connection between the delegated policies represents the flow of the delegation, whereas the edges 
determine the delegation decision, that is, the policy permits (PP) the delegation or denies (DP) it 
to the other policy. 
 
2.4 Ontologies and Access Control Management 
Ontologies have gained a lot of attention in recent years due to their potential as tools to organize 
information and to limit the complexity of knowledge management. Neches [Neches, 1991] 
defines an ontology as: 
“An ontology defines the basic terms and relations comprising the 
vocabulary of a topic area as well as the rules for combining terms and 
relations to define extensions to the vocabulary.” 
Ontologies are useful to enable knowledge transfer and interoperability between heterogeneous 
entities due to the following reasons: (i) they simplify the knowledge sharing among the entities of 
the system; (ii) it is easier to reuse domain knowledge and (iii) they provide a convenient way to 
manage and manipulate domain entities and their interrelationships. 
Ontologies are particularly helpful to formally specify the conceptualization and interrelations 
of a domain of knowledge [Mika, 2007] from which specific domain objects (e.g., users and 
resources) are defined as instances of this conceptualization. The components of an ontology are: 
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classes, objects, relations and attributes. Classes are the elements that conceptualize components 
of a domain. Classes are usually organized in taxonomies that are associated to each other through 
relations, which can be taxonomic (thus defining the type of inheritance among 
superclasses/subclasses) or non-taxonomic(which can define any other type of relationship, such 
as part-of, cause-effect, etc.). Objects are the specific entities of a domain and are represented as 
instances of classes; they may have specific properties that are represented by the attributes of 
these classes.  
Ontologies are also useful to reduce users’ inputs during a change in the modeled domain of 
knowledge [Zablith, 2008]. Nowadays, ontologies are extensively used in many fields of computer 
science, such as artificial intelligence [Batet, 2012, Isern, 2012], software engineering [Isern, 
2011], knowledge engineering [Sánchez, 2010] and natural language processing [Gomez-Perez, 
2007]. Ontologies have gained popularity in natural language processing because they provide 
conceptualization (senses) of linguistic entities and enable to properly understand and compare 
terms. Ontologies are thus useful to manage and understand the semantics of (i) textual documents 
[Sánchez, 2011], (ii) search engine queries [Sánchez, 2013c, Viejo, 2014], (iii) local databases 
[Martínez, 2012a, Martínez, 2012b], (iv) natural language translations, etc. For this purpose, 
several data sources are available that are being used by the system developers, which are 
Wikipedia, DBPedia1, WordNet2, etc.  
The ontological modeling of a domain can be engineered through many languages (e.g., 
ontology inference layer OIL, simple HTML ontology extensions SHOE) but the Ontology Web 
Language (OWL) along with the Resource Description Framework (RDF) are the most commonly 
used ones. In practical terms, ontology engineering (i.e., the act of building ontologies 
representing a domain of knowledge)  consists of [Gomez-Perez, 2007]: 
• Define the classes (concepts) in the ontology. 
• Taxonomically arrange the classes in a hierarchy. 
• Define attributes, their allowed values and the relationships between classes. 
• Define instances of the concepts and perform inferences. 
In the context of our work, ontologies can be useful to manage access control. The modeled 
entities and their interrelations can be used to keep track of the owners of the resources, their type 
of relations with the resource requesters and with the resources. Through an ontology, the access 
privileges on the resources can be easily managed and enforced by following the interrelations of 
the ontological entities involved in access control. Specifically, during the access control 
management, concepts are the entities of a domain (e.g., user or resource that require access 
control management) and objects are the instances of those entities that are linked by means of 
                                                          
1http://wiki.dbpedia.org/ 
2https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ 
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relations. For example: user A can access resource R1, where A andR1 are the instances of the 
concepts/classes (user and resource) and can access is the relation between these instances. 
Properties of the objects are represented with attributes that are also used to state the nature of the 
relationship among the concepts. For example: only users of account department can access 
financial records of employees, where department is the attribute that signifies the employee’s 
affiliation in an organization.  
As discussed earlier in this section, ontologies are useful to study the semantics of textual 
documents, which can be also used to manage access control on the text published over the social 
web. For example: online public forums that allow people to interact with each other and share 
their personal issues to get solutions (e.g., medical advice). For this purpose, the lexical analysis of 
the knowledge source can be performed to identify the sensitive information (e.g., name of 
disease, personal data, etc), which leverages to regulate access control on the published data 
according to the privacy preferences of the users. 
As we discuss in the next section, researchers have used ontologies in access control to 
alleviate some of the problems of RBAC and ABAC, specifically, the definition and management 
of rules and policies [Masoumzadeh, 2010b, Choi, 2014]. Modeling policies in an ontology can 
greatly increase the performance of the system because it can easily retrieve target policy from the 
workflow by following the interrelationship of the target entities instead of searching from the 
database. 
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Chapter 3 State of the Art 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, management of access control in large scale open environments (such 
as online social networks (OSNs) and the cloud) is a challenging task, which requires dealing with 
millions of users who share online resource, data and computation. Moreover, delegation of access 
rights in these environments has also been another focal area of research by the researchers. The 
scientific community has proposed several ontology-based and non-ontology-based solutions to 
manage access control in these environments. Some of these models and their limitations in such 
environments are discussed in following sections. 
3.1 Non-Ontology-based Schemes 
Researchers have proposed several solutions to manage access control management in OSNs. In 
due course, Ghazinour et al. [Ghazinour, 2013] proposed an artificial intelligence-based 
recommender system for OSNs (more specifically, for Facebook) that analyzes privacy 
requirements of the users and assist them by recommending solutions to improve their privacy 
settings. To do so, the system analyzes profile of users that have similar requirements in order to 
construct their data and later use them for recommendations. Moreover, the privacy configurations 
of the users are also analyzed in order to predict topics that are sensitive, and then privacy alerts 
are triggered based on this information. 
In order to achieve the goals mentioned above, the recommender system first builds user data 
by analyzing attributes of the following categories of the OSN: (i) user’s personal profile (e.g., 
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user name, ID, locations etc.); (ii) user’s interests (e.g., movies, books, music etc.); and (iii) user’s 
privacy settings on photo album. The absence of value of any attribute is considered as the gesture 
that the user is reluctant to disclose this information, thus, it requires privacy protection. 
Moreover, the ratio of disclosed elements to the public or friend categories is calculated by the 
system and then used to predict the behavior of the users toward their privacy management and to 
compare them with other users.  
In order to predict the users’ behavior, system categorizes them into three types of people: (i) 
fundamentalists (those with high privacy concerns), (ii) pragmatics (users with medium privacy 
concerns); and (iii) unconcerned (low privacy concern users). The ratio of the profile attributes 
disclosure is calculated and then a decision tree is used to determine their type of category (e.g., 
disclosure ratio=0 then fundamentalist, if ratio > 50% then pragmatic else unconcerned).Based on 
this information, users who have less privacy configurations, but their privacy concerns are closer 
to the one that have more privacy configurations, receive suggestions to improve their privacy. 
This system only recommends options to the users to improve their privacy, but it does not 
provide methods to ensure privacy of the users. Moreover, due to its probabilistic approach, the 
accuracy of recommended settings is a real concern about the reliability of the system. 
In another scheme, Jung et al. [Jung, 2014] proposed property-based access control model for 
the purpose of secure information sharing over OSNs. In addition, they proposed administrative 
model that manages the activities of the OSN to employ access control model. This model resolves 
conflicts between the permissions of the OSN users through their proposed conflict handling 
techniques.  
In this model, OSN entities are categorized into two categories: (i) user; (ii) community; and 
(iii) society. A SN user entity holds four type of properties, which are: (i) contexts that represent 
the attributes of a user like gender, age, date of birth etc.; (ii) tasks is the activity a user that she 
performs over OSN, e.g., publishing message; (iii) resource that is shared or managed by the user 
over OSN, e.g., photo, video, text messages etc.; and (iv) policies that are managed by the user for 
access control management. Similarly, a group of users form a community that cooperates with 
each other to retrieve information of the SN users. These communities have their own set of 
properties (i.e., cooperation property that maintains elements of cooperation among entities in 
addition to the formally mentioned properties of the user entity) that are used to collect related 
information to accomplish these tasks. Finally, the society represent the OSN that supports secure 
cooperation among the SN entities and it has properties similar to the user entity but used for 
different scenario (i.e., w.r.t community). 
To manage access control, the related properties are analyzed in addition to the policies of the 
users in order to make an authorization decision within the given situations. This scheme 
maintains three types of administrators for each type of entity (i.e., society manager, community 
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manager and user manager) that require special handling for the exchange of information between 
those parties, which represents an extra overhead for the system.  
Access control management in the cloud is another area of research where researchers have 
contributed and proposed several solutions.  In due course, Ngo et al. [Ngo, 2015] proposed a 
multi-tenant attribute-based access control management system for inter-cloud services. This 
model is inspired by the ABAC model that implies access control management through the 
attributes of the cloud entities (i.e., subjects, objects and resources). In this model, the access 
control is managed through policies and conflicts between the policies are managed through pre-
defined constraints. 
In this approach, ABAC subjects are decupled into three types, which are: (i) service 
providers; (ii) tenants (services of service providers); and (iii) users. These types of subject are 
modeled and their relationships are defined with each other along with the resources and their 
defined policy. To access a resource, authorization request is originated that contains information 
of the resource requester (i.e., user), requested resource and environment condition (e.g., time, 
location etc.). The system analyzes the request and determines the context relations from the 
model and the access to resource is granted according to the defined policy for the target user. 
The proposed solution only focuses on the infrastructure resources of the cloud (i.e., IaaS) for 
the management of access control. Thus, it does not provide methods to manage access rights of 
the cloud services that may also need access on the resources. Moreover, it does not provide ways 
to manage access control on the distributed tenants or services. 
In another approach, Habiba et al. [Habiba, 2013] proposed authorization-based access control 
model to manage access to the cloud data. For this purpose, a set of access rights (e.g., read, write, 
update etc.) are modeled in a tree that are used as a reference to manage access rights by the owner 
of data. To do so, the owner of a piece of data can transfer her access rights by simply associating 
a node of the tree to the intended user, thus, the following node and its child nodes in the branches 
of the tree that represent specialized access rights are automatically transferred to the user. These 
access rights are managed in the form of policies with several elements (e.g., rule, conditions etc.) 
that enforce access control management. 
This model relies on a layered architecture to manage access control, in which, each layer is 
divided into several modules responsible to manage access rights. For example: management layer 
processes access request, asset layer deals with the cloud resources. This proposed scheme only 
deals with the data and it cannot be applied for other resources of the cloud. Moreover, to find 
target policy, the performance of the system declines due to increased number of policies stored in 
the database. 
Delegation of access rights is another paradigm of access control management. In due course, 
Gusmeroli et al. [Gusmeroli, 2013] proposes a capability (ability of a user to perform specific 
operations) based delegation model in which tokens of authority (or capability tokens that grant 
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access to the users to perform specific operations) are issued by the delegator to the delegatee. 
These tokens contain information about a resource and also the privileges that are being delegated 
along with the lifespan of this token. For this purpose, the capability tokens are created by the 
owner of the resource and distributed to the delegatees, who can further distribute to others (with 
same or different access rights) depending on the delegation depths restricted by the owner. To do 
so, the delegator attaches it’s digitally singed capability token to the request and submits it to the 
service manager (locally maintained service for verification of authority). In turn, the service 
manager performs following two operations to make access decision, which are: (i) it formally 
validates capability from the authorization chain of tokens; and (ii) it validates requested set of 
operations. 
This model is better in terms of verification of authority of the delegator (i.e., the relationship 
of the instances can provide information about a delegatee, delegator and a resource, instead of 
defining constraints/rules for verification). However, for multiple delegations, a delegator needs to 
maintain multiple tokens for each delegation, and this can represent a serious overhead during the 
verification of authority (e.g., in a department with a large number of employees). Furthermore, it 
does not provide any method to verify the authenticity of multiple delegations from a chain of 
delegations (i.e., delegation of different access rights from multiple users for a common 
delegatee). 
In another scheme, Lui et al. [Lui, 2007] proposed a supervision-based delegation model that 
optimizes delegation certificate-based approach with the chained delegation of permission to 
enable users to further delegate access privileges. For this purpose, delegator appoints a 
supervising agent (e.g., it can be a third party user or a software agent) to monitor the activities of 
the delegatee and to grant authorization to the delegatee on her request to exercise delegated 
privileges. The delegation certificate is based on five elements, which are (i) delegator’s public 
key; (ii) public key of delegatee; (iii) a boolean variable that indicates a delegator can further 
delegate access rights; (iv) authorization of rights; and (v) validity of the delegated rights. In this 
scheme, the authors proposed to add supervision as another element in the certificate that contains 
the public key of the supervisor agent. 
In order to delegate privileges, the delegator signs the privileges being delegated (for example, 
read, delete etc.) to the delegatee and computes proxy authorization keys to be transferred to the 
supervisor agent. These proxy keys are used by the supervisor agent to verify the delegation on 
behalf of the delegator. This scheme involves administration burden for keys management and 
may not be suitable for large scale environment where a single supervisor agent need to monitor 
delegatees for their conduct and, at the same time, verify requests on behalf of delegator. 
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3.2 Ontology-based Schemes 
In an ontology-based scheme, Carminati et al. [Carminati, 2009,2011] proposed an ontology-
based model for social network in order to annotate OSN related publications. This ontology 
categorizes and models the following aspects of OSN: (i) users’ personal information (i.e., profile 
data); (ii) users’ relationships; (iii) OSN resources (e.g., pictures, videos, etc.); (iv) relationships 
among users and resources; and (v) actions performed by users (e.g., tag other users in photos, 
publish messages, etc.). 
In this model, the personal information is modeled through the OWL-based ontology called 
Friend-of-a-Friend ontology (FOAF) [Dan Brickley, 2014]. As FOAF models only the basic 
profile information (e.g., name, groups, documents, etc.), thus, this model extends such 
information through the RDF/OWL language that cannot be modeled by the FOAF (e.g., profile 
identities, etc.). Moreover, users’ relations are modeled using a n-ary relationship that connects an 
individual with several others. For this purpose, related classes and their interrelationships were 
defined. A data property TrustValue is defined in order to quantify the level of trust of the users 
and to measure the strength of their relationships. Similarly, in the case of OSN resources, their 
relationships with users and users’ actions are also modeled through the RDF/OWL language 
using several classes with their data properties. 
In these schemes, access control is enforced through the access control policies that authorize 
users according to the type of relationship, relationship depth and the level of trust among these 
users. Authorization of access is regulated through the policy rule. Moreover, users can control 
inappropriate published content through the use of filtering policies. For this purpose, the user 
defines filtering preferences in order to block unwanted content. Admin policies are defined to 
regulate access control and filtering policies that keep record of the users that are authorized to 
define such policies. 
In another ontology-based scheme, Masoumzadeh et al. [Masoumzadeh, 2010b] proposed 
asocial network ontology (SNO) and an ontology-based OSN model (OSNAC) that enforce access 
rights of the users by means of defined rules.SNO models key entities of the OSN into 14concepts 
and 10object properties that represent the relationship among these entities. The ontology was 
built using the OWL web language and RDF was used to model the knowledge of the domain. On 
the other hand, the OSNAC model relies on the SNO for access control management. More 
specifically, it manages two types of access control rules, which are: (i) user rules (it maintains 
personal authorization rules of the users, for example, delegation or authorization of access to the 
personal resources/data); and (ii) system rules (it maintains the rules of the system to manage 
system policies in order to keep a track on the resources and regulate access on them according to 
the users’ rules).  
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In order to regulate the authorization, the authors proposed the use of an access control 
ontology (ACO) in order to model the actions of the users, their privileges on the resources and the 
type of relationships among them.  This ontology models the knowledge through the basic 
ontology of OSN (i.e., SNO) and the privacy policy that contains the privacy preferences of the 
users. 
The above mentioned schemes have some common limitations. The proposed schemes are not 
flexible to modifications in the ontology, profiles or other contents, because they should undergo 
with a lot of manual changes in the ontology and also in the annotation of resources. Moreover, 
there is no mechanism defined to evaluate the sensitiveness of the resources, which leads the 
system to provide a coarse grained access control; this implies that an access to a resource is 
binary, this is, it generates a full access decision or a full deny decision. Besides, a lot of manual 
management by the users and the social network administrator is required in order to configure 
policies for each type of users and OSN resource. 
Bourimi et al. [Bourimi, 2012] proposed an interesting approach to address privacy issues 
related to the linkability of profile data and information sharing by the users on various online 
social networks (OSN) within the context of the European project Digital.Me. In this approach, the 
profile data from two or more OSNs is analyzed and privacy warnings or recommendations are 
triggered to alert the users to apply common privacy settings for similar profiles for her contacts. 
Similarly, the messages published by the users are also semantically analyzed to examine the 
content that may raise privacy concerns for the users. For this purpose, they rely on the ontologies 
that are already defined by them in their prior research work, which are: (i) contact ontology (that 
models user’s contacts); (ii) personal information ontology (to link profile of the users); and (iii) 
live post ontology (to model information content). 
In order to detect similar profiles, natural language processing libraries (NLP) are used and 
these profiles are linked together through the ontology for the management of common privacy 
settings. To do so, the profile data from OSNs is retrieved through the contact APIs (for similar 
attribute detection) and then modeled through the defined contact ontology. For this purpose, NLP 
libraries evaluate profile attributes and compare them syntactically and semantically.  Finally, the 
profiles that match with each other are linked together through the personal information ontology. 
On the other hand, the published content that may hamper privacy of the users is analyzed. To do 
so, the content to be published is analyzed semantically by using NLP libraries to identify 
information content and related resources (e.g., actions, user names etc.), which are then modeled 
through the live post ontology. 
This scheme only models users that have a similar profile and cannot model other entities; as a 
result, it may require separate access control management for the rest of entities. Moreover, the 
proposed solution does not specify any method to enforce privacy. 
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Choi et al. [Choi, 2014] proposed ontology-based access control model that manages access 
rights in the cloud environment. They proposed a content-aware approach that determines the type 
of users (i.e., service provider or normal user), their context information from the ontology (i.e., 
relationship type of the user with the resource) and their access rules from the policies that are 
managed locally in a repository. This model is composed of the following two basic modules: (i) 
context analysis engine; and (ii) access control module, which are discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
The context analysis engine is responsible for selection and integration of context information 
of users and resources, and then renders this information to the access control module. The access 
control module manages this information by means of an ontology (i.e., context ontology), 
moreover, it identifies and authenticates an access requester based on her context information and 
security policy, which is kept locally by this module. Finally, the authentication information is 
rendered to the context module that, in turn, regulates the access to the requested resource. 
The proposed ontology only models the context information of users and resources (i.e., type 
of users and their relationship with the resources); it does not model the policies defined for these 
entities. Thus, the system needs to map the context information with the policy database in order 
to get the appropriate policy, which represents an extra overhead and makes the processing of any 
access request more complex.  
In another ontology-based approach, Liu [Liu, 2014] modeled a set of operations of cloud 
business services: (i) payment status (to keep record of users’ payment to access cloud resources); 
(ii) service level agreement (the level of access on the resource) to manage access control of the 
users on cloud resources; and (iii) role of users (to distinguish valued users from regular ones). For 
this purpose, they designed an access control model (i.e., CSAC) that regulates access based on 
the ontological relationship between users and resources. In this model, the central server manages 
access control by processing an access request of the users and it regulates access based on the 
ontological relationships and the policy that is managed by the administrator of the system. In 
addition, several rules are specified to tackle policy conflicts and to manage unauthorized access 
of the users. 
Again, this ontology is not generic and it is limited to model specific cloud services (i.e., 
payment status only), thus, it provides ad-hoc inference system for rules. Moreover, administrator 
of the system needs to manage ontological relationships and other operations of the system that 
may affect the performance of the system, which is also not feasible for the distributed scenarios. 
Xu et al. [Xu, 2009] proposed a delegation model that extends XACML delegation profile by 
incorporating roles as the attributes of the users that are stored within the policies. These roles are 
delegated to the users in order to grant access privileges that can be further delegated to other 
users and represented in role hierarchy. In order to manage access control, following roles are 
defined for the actors of the system, which are: (i) regular roles (used for normal access rights); (ii) 
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delegable roles (roles that can be delegated to other users); (iii) delegated roles (delegable role that 
has been delegated to users); and (iv) administrative roles (assigned to administrators to manage 
roles that are delegable). They further enhanced XACML profile by providing delegation and 
administration enforcement mechanism in order to tackle policy conflicts (i.e., read and write 
operations occurring simultaneously).   
In this approach, the authority of the delegators is verified from the role hierarchy that is 
generated as a result of each resource request. This can result in a serious performance overhead in 
a large scale environment dealing with a large number of delegatees during the following actions: 
(i) searching within a large number of delegated policies on an access request; and (ii) generation 
of the graph on each access request. Moreover, management and enforcement of multiple roles is 
an extra overhead to the administrator of the system. 
In another XACML based approach [Seitz, 2005], a delegator can delegate either access level 
authorization or administrative level authorization. Access level authorization is a four-way tuple 
that contains information about the subject (delegatee), object (resource to be shared), method 
(corresponds to action) and time interval (timestamp until the authorization is valid). Whereas, 
administrative level authorization allows users to delegate their access privileges to other users 
through the policy rules.  
In this approach, access privileges are defined through the policy and system is capable to 
create a new policy by updating an existing policy of a delegatee (in the case if administrative 
privileges are begin granted to the normal access users). In order to enforce delegation, a locally 
maintained system performs the authorization of delegated policies. To process an access request, 
they used a tool XPath (which has XML-like structure) that matches the attributes of the request 
with the attributes of the policy (i.e., subject and object).  
This system is customized for a specific application (i.e., account management) and cannot 
serve large scale cloud operations (i.e., federated cloud environments). Moreover, the delegation 
records are maintained in the local repository of the policy that can be expensive solution in terms 
of performance in order to search a required policy from this repository. 
In another approach, Wainer et al. [Wainer, 2005, Wainer, 2007] proposed a user-to-user 
privilege delegation and revocation mechanism by extending the RBAC model. They implemented 
this model for workflow management systems (i.e., a system designed to manage users’ 
workflows within the business processes). In this model, a delegator can delegate specific access 
rights rather than the entire role (which contain all the access rights) to a delegatee. For this 
purpose, a generic algorithm for delegation is proposed and authority of the delegators is verified 
by generating a delegation graph. In order to enforce delegation, authorization rules are specified 
(in the form of constraints) that overrule the roles already assigned to a delegatee in order to 
implement the delegated privileges. Furthermore, the verification of the delegator’s authority to 
delegate privileges is assessed by the administrative roles (roles that acknowledge her privileges as 
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delegator) assigned to them. These delegation and authorization processes are applied by means of 
specially designed services and protocols.  
In general, RBAC-based mechanisms may not perform efficiently in cloud environments due 
to the following reasons: (i) the manual management of multiple roles (i.e., access roles and 
delegated roles) for each delegator and delegate; and (ii) the burden on a single entity for the 
enforcement of these roles for multiple tenants (e.g., users and CSPs). Moreover, it is hard to 
verify the authenticity of the delegators from the role hierarchy due to the following reasons: (i) it 
is difficult to determine who is delegating and what resources does she own to delegate; and (ii) 
the role hierarchy can be forged to gain unauthorized access on given resources. 
3.3 Comparative analysis of State of the Art 
In table 3.1, we have analyzed the aforementioned approaches according to the several 
elements that are required for any efficient solution, which are:  
 
(i) Adaptability: Due to the dynamic nature of open environments, ontology-based 
approaches must support additional entities without requiring to change the structure 
of the ontology.  
(ii) Automatic Configuration: Systems must provide automatic configuration 
management of users’ privacy requirements and it must have less manual 
management by the administrators or users of the system. 
(iii) Scalability: the proposed approach must be suitable for large scale and distributed 
environments and it must be capable to serve large number of users in an efficient 
manner.  
(iv) Fine grained access control: The proposed solutions must provide a fine grained 
access control mechanism that could support instance level access instead of a whole 
class. 
(v) Policy Modeling / Policy-based: Proposed systems must model policies within the 
ontology to avoid policy search overhead (as happens in the repository-based 
systems).  
(vi) Generic ontology: Finally, the approach needs to be generic that it can be 
transformed to any environment that requires access control management with fewer 
modifications. 
 
These elements are derived based on the limitations of the existing solutions (discussed in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2); thus, they serve as essential elements for any reliable/efficient access control 
mechanism. The elements such as Adaptability, policy modeling and generic ontology are the 
 crucial elements for the success of any ontology
integrated in any large and dynamic 
efficiency of the mechanism that 
In the following analysis, there is no such solution that 
they have some limitations. Though, the solution proposed by 
better than rest of the solution
not a generic solution and it
transformation into another environment. Moreover, it has overhead of policy search from 
database while processing resource access request.
 
Table 3.1 Comparative analysis of ontology and non
Approaches Adaptability
Carminati et al. 
[Carminati, 
2009,2011] 
Masoumzadeh et al. 
[Masoumzadeh, 
2010b] 
Bourimi et al. 
[Bourimi, 2012] 
Choi et al. [Choi, 
2014] 
Liu [Liu, 2014] 
Xu et al. [Xu, 2009] 
Seitz et al. [Seitz, 
2005]  
Wainer et al. [Wainer, 
2005, Wainer, 2007] 
Ghazinour et al. 
[Ghazinour, 2013] N/A
Jung et al. [Jung, 
2014] N/A
Ngo et al. [Ngo, 
2015] N/A
Habiba et al. [Habiba, 
2013] 
Gusmeroli et al. 
[Gusmeroli, 2013] N/A
Lui et al. [Lui, 2007] N/A
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Chapter 4 Ontology-based Access Control Management 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As mentioned in the chapter 2 (section 2.2), the access control management on the resource is 
regulated based on the privacy requirements of the owner. This greatly depends on the openness of 
the mechanism how efficiently it deals with such requirements and provides options/solutions that 
fulfill them. To achieve this goal, system designers have offered several solutions that are based 
on either RBAC or ABAC as generic models to manage access control. These include: classifying 
resources into categories [Cheng, 2012b], itemizing profile data into different elements [Aïmeur, 
2010] or classifying users into lists (e.g., blacklist users) [Cramer, 2015]. However, these methods 
do not scale well in large and complex environments because of: (i) the growing privacy 
configuration requirements and the incapability of existing solutions to handle them in an efficient 
manner [Beato, 2009]; and (ii) the burden of the definition and management of rules by users and 
administrators [Daud, 2015]. 
To overcome these shortcomings, the scientific community has proposed solutions to manage 
access control that model entity types as graphs [Pang, 2014, Cramer, 2015]; within ontologies 
[Carminati, 2009, Masoumzadeh, 2010b, Choi, 2014]; for role-based access control [Ben-Fadhel, 
2015]; or for attribute-based access control [Smari, 2014]. Ontologies are particularly helpful to 
formally specify the conceptualization and interrelations of a domain [Mika, 2007], so that 
specific entities (e.g., users and resources) can be defined as instances of this conceptualization. 
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Then, access control can be easily managed according to the (privacy-oriented) interrelations 
defined in the ontology for the involved entities. Usually, ontology-based approaches define ad-
hoc ontologies for concrete scenarios, which limit their generality and hamper the interoperability 
between heterogeneous settings (i.e., each one is based on a different ontological backbone) (e.g., 
see [Pang, 2014]). 
To tackle these limitations, we present a generic ontology-based solution inspired in the 
Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) paradigm that models entities and their access policies. 
This system provides the following benefits: (i) a generic ontology that can be easily extended for 
specific environments, so that access control can be defined at different levels of granularity; and 
(ii) it simplifies the definition and enforcement of rules, thanks to the automatic ontology-based 
inference of rules. In order to demonstrate its applicability and benefits, we have applied it to two 
large and open scenarios: OSNs and the Cloud.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present general ontology for 
access control management. In section 4.3 and 4.4, we extend our general ontology for open 
scenarios, OSNs and cloud respectively, in order to show its applicability and access control rules 
management. Finally, in section 4.5, we provide the conclusions. 
 
The content of this chapter has been published in: 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2016), Ontology-based Access Control 
Management: Two Use Cases, in:  Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on 
Agents and Artificial Intelligence, Rome, Italy, pp. 244-249. 
4.2 A general ontology for access control management 
The backbone of our ontology (which is shown in Figure 4.1) is inspired in the ABAC model. It 
models the three basic (ABAC) entities required to manage access control: subject, object and 
policy. Subjects can be the owners of the resources that define access rights for other users or they 
can be the target users over whom the access control should be enforced. Objects are the resources 
(e.g., services, files, messages, etc.) that require protection from unauthorized access; they are 
protected by defining policies that contain access rules. The access rule is represented by the 
following tuple. 
rule ≡ < si, oj, a > 
where si is the subject target user, oj represents the object resource and the element a is the 
action that holds access decision (e.g., allow, deny). 
The ontological property (i.e., access rights on) between the subject and the object determines 
the role of the user w.r.t. the resource (i.e., owner of the resource or the one who requests access to 
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the resource). Likewise, the defines property between the subject and the policy indicates the 
relationship of policy maker with the policy, whereas, the written for property shows the 
relationship between the target user and the policy itself. Finally, each resource is associated with 
the policy through the has property. 
The generic design of the ontology allows us to define general rules that refer to the abstract 
classes (i.e., subject, object and policy) rather than to specific entities. Then, entities involved in 
the specific scenario (i.e., concrete users and resources) can be represented as instances of 
ontological classes and, thus, access control over these entities can be enforced on the basis of 
general rules by relying on the ontological structure (i.e., specific rules at an entity level can be 
automatically derived from the general rules defined at a class level). Moreover, the generic 
ontology can be specialized with more specific classes that are appropriate for a concrete scenario 
and, accordingly, more specific rules can be tailored (in any case, without require to define them 
on entity-basis). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Access control ontology 
In order to take authorization decisions, the access control mechanism evaluates the 
interrelationship and the attributes of subject, object and policy, as stated in the ABAC model. 
Specifically, the system determines the following information from the ontology: (i) the resource 
requestor, (ii) the owner of the resource, (iii) the resource itself, and (iv) the policy defined by the 
owner of resource.  
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
24 
 
In the following subsections, we show how our generic ontology can be extended to model the 
entities involved in two widespread scenarios: OSNs and the Cloud. 
4.3 OSNs Use Case 
Online social networks (OSN) such as Twitter, Facebook, Google+, Myspace, etc., are platforms 
where people interact with each other by publishing messages. In these platforms, users can build 
their own social circles of friends and join social groups or communities. In these groups and 
communities, strangers may connect with each other according to their common interests, views or 
activities [Boyd, 2007]. In social networks, users spend most of their time in publishing or 
accessing information about such activities. Very frequently, the published content may contain 
sensitive data such as date of birth, political views, religious views, medical-related information or 
others.  
Publicly shared content containing that sensitive information can be easily revealed by means 
of messages, profile data or social apps (like games). This data may portray a person’s social or 
inner life [Gross, 2005], which constitutes a serious privacy issue. Social networks such as 
Facebook3 and Twitter4 consider trusted and non-trusted users as friends [Shehab, 2012], but the 
trust of such friends cannot be measured [Boyd, 2007]. As a result, sensitive information may be 
revealed to non-trusted users. Moreover, Johnson’s analysis [Johnson, 2012] concludes that the 
majority of users are more concerned with internal threats of privacy (i.e., from friends) rather 
than strangers. For this reason, most of the OSN friends are considered untrustworthy to share 
sensitive information. On the other hand, according to the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights & Council of Europe [Europe], this sensitive information needs to be 
protected from untrusted third parties, because it can be exploited by such parties for their own 
benefit [Viejo, 2013].  
For this purpose, we present a mechanism to ensure privacy of the OSN users by managing 
access rights on the shared resource. Figure 4.2 presents the extension of our general ontology that 
models OSN entities and their interrelationships. In this scenario, the subject entities of the OSN 
(i.e., owners of the resources) manage their access rights on objects (e.g., photos, text messages, 
videos, etc.) by defining access control policies over other subjects (i.e., other users with whom 
the owners are in contact). The rules are the attributes of these policies that hold access right 
decisions (i.e., allow or deny access to a resource uploaded by the owner). Since OSNs allow users 
to classify their contacts into different categories (e.g., close friends, family friends, strangers, 
etc.), the subject class has been specialized with a contact subclass that encompasses the contact 
types of the users. This specialization is also helpful for the users to define different access rules 
                                                          
3
 http://www.facebook.com 
4
 https://twitter.com/ 
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according to the contact category of the users. Finally, user is modeled in a subclass of the subject 
class; their membership to a certain contact type of the owner of a resource is represented with the 
has property.  
 
Figure 4.2 Extended access control ontology for OSNs 
The object class constitutes the resources that require protection from unauthorized access. In 
the context of OSNs, objects are specialized in specific resource types (i.e., photo, video, profile, 
text, etc.) so that a more fine-grained access control can be enforced; that is, managing access 
control on each resource type rather than applying the same rule for all the resources. The profile 
class is further classified into two subclasses: (i) profile data, which details the identity of the 
users, and whose access could be protected in order to avoid identity disclosure and (ii) other 
related information (e.g., interests of the users), which may refer to confidential information. 
Even though this ontology represents the entity types involved in an OSN, it can be further 
extended to accommodate the specificities of a particular vendor (e.g., Facebook), such as 
predefined contact types or more specific resource types. 
4.3.1 Access control management and enforcement 
As discussed in section 4.2, a user may limit the access to her resources by defining an access rule 
for a set of target users. With our ontology-based approach, the rule can be defined for ontological 
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classes at any level of abstraction so that it would be automatically enforced for the corresponding 
subclasses and, finally, instances (entities) of such classes. Within the OSNs scenario, the default 
rule for all the resources is deny access, so that the user only needs to define allow permissions. 
The following example illustrates the extension and instantiation of the OSN ontology for a 
specific scenario and the automatic inference of rules and their enforcement. 
Example 1: Figure 4.3 illustrates the ontological specialization and instantiation of social 
network entities associated to the Alice’s social account (e.g. Facebook). As privacy preferences, 
she defines a rule to allow her family friends to access her resources (i.e., ruleAlice≡ < family 
friends, resource, ‘allow’>). This rule is encompassed in the policy instance that is linked with the 
instance of the resource being referenced and the instance of the target subject (i.e., contact type 
family friends). Since, this rule is defined at a class level (i.e., family friends in contact and 
resource as a whole), by ontological inference, it will be automatically enforced on all the 
subsequent entities. Since Bob is a family friend of Alice and by the inference of generic rule, the 
system grants full access to Bob on photo and video instances. Specifically, the following rules are 
generated for the instances of the user that are family friends of Alice (only Bob in the given case). 
ruleAlice ≡ < Bob, “college.jpg”, ‘allow’ > 
ruleAlice ≡ < Bob, “family.jpg”, ‘allow’ > 
ruleAlice ≡ < Bob, “party.avi”, ‘allow’ > 
ruleAlice ≡ < Bob, “festival.avi”, ‘allow’ > 
In any case, Alice can also define rules for specific instances of the user class. For example: 
Alice may only allow Alex, from close friends contacts, to access all of her photos (i.e., ruleAlice≡ < 
Alex, photos, ‘allow’>). Thus, the following rules are inferred from this generic rule. 
ruleAlice ≡ < Alex, “college.jpg”, ‘allow’ > 
ruleAlice ≡ < Alex, “family.jpg”, ‘allow’ > 
 
Figure 4.3 Instantiation of the OSN ontology for user Alice 
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4.4 Cloud Use Case 
Cloud computing provides a ubiquitous platform to share resources and to provide cloud services 
to tenants. Because of its open nature, it requires a scalable mechanism that manages access 
control on the shared resources. Usually, a cloud relies on the following multi-level service models 
[Rountree, 2014] that are used to deliver cloud services: (i) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
where physical computing resources are shared among cloud users; (ii) Platform as a Service 
(PaaS), which provides databases and operating systems; and (iii) Software as a Service (SaaS), 
which provides software applications. To manage access rights in cloud, we extend our general 
ontology to incorporate the cloud entities and the attributes that are relevant to manage access 
rights in the cloud environment. 
is-a
is
-a is
-a
is-a
 
Figure 4.4 Extended access control ontology for the cloud 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the extended ontology that lists cloud entities (tenant, cloud service and 
cloud resource) and their interrelationships. In this illustration, tenant is a subclass of subject that 
holds cloud actors, which are: (i) user (which use cloud services) and (ii) cloud service provider 
(CSP) (which provides and shares cloud services). Likewise, service is a subclass of subject that 
represents the services provided by the CSPs, these services may require access to shared 
resources to accomplish their tasks. On the other hand, service is also a subclass of object because 
the tenants may access them as cloud service. Finally, cloud resources can be hardware resource 
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(e.g., servers, storage space, etc) or software resource (e.g., web application, web services, etc.). 
Cloud service providers can manage the access to their shared resources and services by defining a 
rule that is encompassed within a policy, as explained for OSNs in the previous section. The 
following example illustrates the enforcement of rules in the cloud scenario. 
4.4.1 Access control management and enforcement 
Example 2: Figure 4.5 illustrates the extension and instantiation of the cloud ontology for CSP 
(Google) that offers its services and resources to the users. In this example, Google offers 
different cloud services at different service levels (i.e., SaaS, PaaS and IaaS) for standard users 
and educational institutions (e.g., educational institutions are offered more space on Google drive 
and a professional domain for email). Google configures the access to its resources and services 
with the following two rules: (i) it allows SaaS services to access all the resources (hardware and 
software); and (ii) it grants users belonging to any educational institution with special access to its 
Cloud services that are meant for an educational purpose. In this last case, and in coherency with 
the ABAC model, we can rely on the attributes defined for the ontological classes and instances. 
Thus, the following generic rules are defined: 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < SaaS, resource, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R2 ≡ < Users <U_Type=“Education”>, Cloud Services <S_Type=“Education”>, 
‘allow’ > 
 
Figure 4.5 Instantiation of the Cloud ontology for Google 
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The ruleGoogle-R1 is defined at the conceptual level (i.e., at resource and SaaS classes) of the 
ontology and, thus, it covers all the entities below the hardware resource and software resource 
classes. By inferring specific rules at the instance level, we obtain the following ones: 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < Gmail, e-mail server, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < Gmail, storage drive, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < Gmail, e-mail applications, ‘allow’> 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < GmailEdu, e-mail server, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ < GmailEdu, storage drive, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R1 ≡ <GmailEdu, e-mail applications, ‘allow’ > 
On the other hand, ruleGoogle-R2 grants access to cloud services that are specifically allocated to 
educational institutions. To manage this, the type of users is determined through the value of the 
U_Type attribute of the entities, whereas the educational services are determined by the value of 
the S_Type attribute. As a result, the educational instances of the user class are distinguished and 
granted access to all cloud services that are allocated for educational institutions. The following 
rules are, thus, generated due to the inference of this generic rule. 
ruleGoogle-R2 ≡< Institute-1,GmailEdu, ‘allow’ > 
ruleGoogle-R2≡<Institute-1,Google DriveEdu, ‘allow’ > 
4.5 Conclusions  
In this chapter, we proposed a generic ontology that models entities, their interrelationships and 
access control policies, and it can be easily extended for specific environments. To show its 
applicability, we extended it for two large and open scenarios: OSNs and the cloud. We also 
illustrated through examples how the definition of rules and the management of access control are 
greatly simplified for system administrators, because they can be intuitively made at a conceptual 
class-level. Then, specific (and dynamic) rules can be automatically inferred according to the 
specific entities, which would also be likely dynamic in open scenarios such as those tackled in the 
chapter.  
  
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
30 
 
  
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Ontology-based Access Control Delegation 
Enforcement 
 
5.1 Introduction  
As introduced in chapter 2 (section 2.3), delegation mechanism enable users to transfer their 
access rights on a particular resource to other in order to lower their administration burden and to 
manage access control. Most of the delegation mechanisms are based on the role-based access 
control (RBAC) model [Sandhu, 1996], where access rights are delegated in the form of roles. 
Few models rely on the attribute-based access control (ABAC) model [Hu, 2014] for delegation, 
where delegation is managed by using policies instead of roles.  
Delegation of access control is particularly challenging in dynamic and distributed scenarios 
due to large number of entities with heterogeneous requirements. Therefore, delegation 
enforcement in these scenarios require extensive administrative burden on the 
users/administrators. In the following we illustrate this kind of scenarios with a paradigmatic 
example (i.e., cloud computing).  
Cloud service providers (CSPs) share these services among distinct organizations or end users 
that are called tenants. In a multi-tenant environment (i.e., a single resource shared with multiple 
tenants), access control management on shared services is a serious concern for CSPs [Manvi, 
2014]. Ideally, the shared services need to be accessed only by the tenants that are authorized by 
the pertinent CSPs. On the other hand, CSPs are burdened to efficiently manage access control due 
to the diversity of cloud services and the diverse security requirements of the tenants. For 
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example, an organization may have a large number of users with different types of roles, and the 
access to shared services must be distributed according to these roles. To handle this situation, one 
of the solutions implemented by CSPs is the delegation of access control. Delegation brings a 
number of advantages that includes decentralization of access control, better scalability for large 
organizations, and seamless management of role-change requests. With delegation, a CSP acting 
as the delegator can transfer its administrative privileges on a particular service to other tenants 
that are called delegatees. In turn, these tenants can manage the access control on the delegated 
services for other users according to their own requirements. 
In a cloud environment, delegators delegate their access rights to tenants on the same or 
different level of the service model in a hierarchal way (i.e., IaaS, PaaS and SaaS). However, due 
to the heterogeneity of the cloud federation [Kurze, 2011] (a cloud environment where CSPs share 
cloud resources to other service providers) and the lack of trust, the delegation of access rights can 
be a serious concern for end-to-end authorization and verification of the delegators [Nahrstedt, 
2012]. Authorization refers to the process of specifying and transferring access rights from a 
delegator to a delegatee within the cloud. In contrast, verification validates the privileges of a 
delegator that allow her to manipulate the authorized resources. However, the identity of the 
delegators could be forged in order to gain or delegate unauthorized privileges (which is a 
spoofing attack) [Wang, 2008]. In this respect, existing cloud services (e.g., Microsoft Azure) 
implement conventional and simple methods of delegation; for example, the delegation 
mechanism of Azure is based on the credentials of the user (i.e., username and password). This 
approach requires a centralized management of the user credentials that can overhead the 
administrator and may not be feasible for an organization that requires further delegations to 
employees with limited access. 
In this chapter, we propose an ontology-based delegation framework (with cloud-centered 
improvement) to the XACML delegation profile [XACML-Profile, 2009] (i.e., XACML extended 
with delegation concepts), wherein the access rights are delegated in the form of policies. In 
contrast to the methods [Sohr, 2012, Ruan, 2014], our approach does not require specifying 
constraints or rules for enforcing delegation; instead, the delegation enforcement is managed by 
means of automatic algorithms. To attain this, we use our already proposed access control 
ontology (in chapter 4, section 4.2) that can be instantiated with the cloud entities in order to 
demonstrate delegation workflow. Consequently, our scheme overcomes the need of generating a 
delegation graph as a result of each resource request by the user; instead, the interrelations of the 
entities are used to validate the users’ access request. Moreover, trust is built through the trusted 
policy that originates delegation workflow, and it is digitally signed by the resource provider 
authority that initiates the delegation process, which also owns the resource. In the following, the 
main contributions of our research work are summarized: 
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• We use our already proposed ontology in chapter 4 (section 4.4) to model the entities 
involved in the delegation process (with cloud as scenario), which includes subjects (i.e., 
delegators or delegatees), objects (resources or services), policies (document that translate 
delegated privileges) and their interrelations. Through that ontology, we can keep a track of 
who is delegating, what privileges on a resource are being delegated and it also provides an 
intuitive solution to verify the attributes of the actors involved in any delegation. 
• We present a distributed delegation model for the cloud by classifying its main actors (e.g., 
cloud providers, CSPs, organizations and users) into different delegation levels, wherein the 
access rights on the resources can be delegated in a distributed way. In contrast to other 
solutions ( e.g., [XACML-Profile, 2009]), the delegation of access rights are managed in a 
distributed way and the authenticity of the delegation policy is verified with the trusted 
policy that is written and signed by the CSP (which is the owner of the resource). 
• In contrast to the method that verify the delegator’s authority through roles [Ahn, 2007], our 
system automatically verifies the authority through the attributes of the entities and the policy 
of the delegator by following the interrelations of the entities (represented as instances of the 
ontology), which leads to the trusted policy. 
• Contrary to studies [Wainer, 2005, Wainer, 2007], our system does not require the 
specification of rules for delegation enforcement, but it automatically enforces delegation, 
verifies the delegated authority and also revokes the delegated privileges by using simple 
algorithms. In addition, we do not require any additional rules to implement delegated 
policies; instead, it automatically implements a delegated policy by applying a policy 
combining algorithm that combines the normal access policy and the delegated policy. 
Moreover, this algorithm resolves possible policy conflicts within the entities. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we present the cloud-centered 
delegation ontology. In section 5.3, we detail the enforcement of the delegation by means of 
several algorithms. Section 5.4 discusses and evaluates the performance of the proposed system. 
Finally, in section 5.5, we provide the conclusions. 
The content of this chapter has been published in / submitted to: 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2015), Ontology-Based Delegation of Access 
Control: An Enhancement to the XACML Delegation Profile, in: Fischer-Hübner S, 
Lambrinoudakis C, López J (Eds.) Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business: 12th 
International Conference, TrustBus 2015, Valencia, Spain, September 1-2, 2015, 
Proceedings, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2015, pp. 18-29. 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, Ontology-based Access Control Delegation 
Enforcement for the Cloud, in: Security and Communication Networks, (Under Review) 
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5.2 Ontology-based Delegation 
Our model is based on the XACML delegation profile [XACML-Profile, 2009]. In this profile, the 
authority of the policy issuer is validated through the delegation graph that is generated on each 
user’s request for a resource. To do so, the attributes of an access request (which includes the 
attributes of the user and the requested resource) are matched with the attributes of the delegated 
policies stored in the database. As a result, the delegated policies related to the requested resource 
are determined and represented as a graph by creating edges between the delegated policy nodes. 
This graph plots the hierarchy of the delegated policies of the delegators of the same resource. 
Finally, the authority of the delegator that issued the policy to the requester is verified through this 
graph by verifying the hierarchy of all preceding delegators. As a result, the access to the resource 
is managed according to the flow of the graph (i.e., each predecessor delegator in the hierarchy 
grants access privileges to the successors). We can see that, due to the overhead of searching 
policies and generating the policy graph for each access request, this approach may not scale well 
in the cloud scenario due to: (i) the large number and heterogeneity of entities (users, resources, 
policies) that could be involved in a delegation; and (ii) the large number of access request that 
should be managed by the CSP. 
Our model is extension of the XACML delegation profile that incorporates an ontology and 
models the semantics of (attribute-based) access control and its delegation in the cloud scenario. 
The use of an ontological paradigm [Guarino, 1998] to model the delegation workflow has the 
following benefits: (i) it is simple and the delegation process can be implemented easily; and (ii) it 
automatically defines and interprets the relations between the entities [Carminati, 2009]. Our 
ontology models the entities (i.e. delegator, delegatee and resource types) and their interrelations 
involved in the delegation process in cloud scenarios. In this ontology modeling, the entities 
correspond to the instances of the classes, and the delegation workflow is represented through 
their interrelations. Similarly, to process access request of the tenant, the delegator’s authority 
(e.g., a CSP)) is evaluated and verified through the interrelationship of the instances of the 
ontology (it include hierarchy of the delegators’, the delegatee and resource that is delegated) in 
spite of searching entities within the policies In this solution, the attributes of an access request are 
determined and compared with the instances that represent cloud entities; as a result, their related 
policy is determined for from the database in order to get the rules defined for these entities. 
Contrary to the XACML profile that maintains policies of all delegators sharing a common 
resource within a policy set, in our system, a policy set only contains the policies issued by a 
single subject for a single resource and each delegator maintains its own policy set. By doing so, 
we reduce the overhead of (i) searching policy issuer from a policy set in a large scale 
environment where delegators are large in number, and (ii) generate policy graph to validate 
delegation authority for access request.  
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Figure 5.1 Structure of policies and access request 
In this model, a cloud user can manage two set of policies (listed in Figure 5.1): (i) an access 
policy (which permits or denies access on the resource); and (ii) an administrative policy (which 
gives privileges to the tenant to issue policies to other tenants). For example, in Figure 5.1(a), a 
CSP manages the access to a resource (i.e., printer-1) by allowing Alice to use the printing facility. 
On the other hand, in Figure 5.1(b) the CSP delegates the authority to Alice (of the employee 
department) to issue policies (access or administrative policies) on the same resource. To grant a 
limited access to the resource, the delegator can limit the privileges through the rule attribute of 
the policy. 
Contrary to the XACML profile, each delegator only maintains those policies in a policy set 
that are defined for a common resource. Whereas, in the XACML profile, a policy set holds 
policies of all delegators that share privileges on a common resource. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the cloud relies on a multi-level service model, wherein, services and resources are 
managed in a decentralized way. Therefore, due to its central management of the policies, this 
profile is not feasible in a cloud environment due to its distributed management of users and 
policies. Moreover, there is a significant overhead while searching some entity (as a result of 
access request) from a given policy set due to: (i) the usually large number of users within the 
cloud; and (ii) the need for searching all the policies to get the related policy from a given policy 
set. Thus, this approach renders following benefits: (i) decentralized management of policy sets; 
(ii) feasible to delegate in the distributed environment; and (iii) it improves the methods of 
delegator’s authority verification. 
5.2.1 Ontology Representation of ABAC and Cloud Entities 
The entities involved in the ABAC model are subjects, objects and policies. Subjects usually own 
or delegate privileges on resource objects (e.g., services, network resources, data sets, or 
applications) by managing the access control as policies. That is achieved by defining access 
control policy rules for the resource objects and the target subjects. In order to enforce access 
rights, the subject and the object attributes are evaluated to take authorization decisions. For 
authorization, these attributes are evaluated against the policy rules and, based on this evaluation, 
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access decisions are taken. To do so, a module of XACML (i.e., PIP, the policy information point) 
manipulates the attributes of the entities. In the same way, access rights can be delegated to other 
subjects through delegation policies, which contain the attributes and the rules of the entities 
defined for the delegated resources.  
To manage the delegation workflow in an automatic way, the cloud entities modeled in an 
ontology (chapter 4, section 4.4) are represented as classes. In this manner, the policy attributes 
(those in figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b)) can be manipulated in order to model interrelations of the 
entities as ontological properties. The directed edges of this ontology represent the relationships 
among the entities, which depict a taxonomic dependency within classes or subclasses (e.g., types 
of subjects or objects) or associative properties between classes (e.g., access right of a subject over 
an object).  
 
Figure 5.2 Ontology modelling delegation process for cloud entities 
For our reference, we redraw our proposed ontology presented in chapter 4 (section4.4) in 
figure 5.2 that depicts the cloud entities (as ontology classes) and the logics of the delegation 
process (as class interrelationships). This cloud ontology enables users and CSPs to delegate 
access rights on the cloud services or resources by managing delegated policies in order to 
manage access control. 
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5.2.2 Workflow Delegation Representation 
In this section, the proposed ontology (shown in Figure 5.2) is instantiated in order to show the 
delegation workflow and its applicability in the cloud environment. For this propose, the subjects, 
objects and policies entities are instantiated and interrelated according to ontological properties. In 
this modeling, the delegator subject maintains its policy set in the local repository that lists the 
details of the delegatees authorized on a certain resource. The instances of the delegator and 
delegatee are linked together through the policy instance, whereas, the delegated resource has a 
direct interrelation with the owner and the delegated policy.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Delegation workflow representation 
Figure 5.3 presents the delegation workflow instantiated from the basic ontology proposed for 
the cloud scenario (presented in section 5.2.1). In this workflow, e-mail service and storage 
service (instances of the Cloud service class) are offered by the cloud service provider CSP1, who 
is the owner of these services. In the next level of this workflow, the privileges on these services 
are delegated to other organizations by maintaining separate policies for each service. Thus, the 
policy set P1 maintains the access privileges delegated to the org-1 and org-2, whereas, P2 
maintains the access privileges delegated to org-3. Org-1 and org-3 are granted only with an 
access policy (i.e., they can access e-mail and storage services respectively, but they cannot 
further delegate); whereas, org-2 holds an administrative policy and it can further delegate access 
privileges of the e-mail service. In the next level of the delegation workflow, the access privileges 
on the e-mail service are further delegated by org-2 to users Alex and Ted by maintaining a policy 
set P4, which only contains access policies. 
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5.2.3 Workflow of the system 
When a cloud user delegates her access privileges, the system automatically determines the 
instances and generates the interrelations of the entities (i.e., delegator, delegatee, resource 
delegated and policy set) involved in the delegation process according the ontological structure; 
this process is algorithmically formalized in Section 5.3. As a result, and on contrary to the 
XACML profile, we do not need to generate a delegation graph on each request. Instead, our 
workflow is updated on each delegation request, thus rendering the delegation verification more 
efficient, as it will be discussed in section 5.4.  
In order to process an access request, first, the system verifies the access privileges of the user 
from the policy linked to her within the delegation workflow. Then, the system determines the 
policy issuer (i.e., the one who issued policy to the access requester) from the delegation 
workflow, and verifies her authenticity; this process is formalized in section 5.3.2. For this 
purpose, the attributes of the policy instances in the delegation workflow that are connected to the 
access requester are examined and cross matched with the attributes of the access request (as listed 
in Figure 5.1(c)). In the case that the required delegated policy is found, the system verifies the 
authenticity of the policy issuer by generating an administrative request. For this purpose, the 
delegator’s instance linked to the target access policy is determined, and the delegator’s attributes 
are examined and verified. In this way, the authority of the delegators who are in the chain of 
delegation to the target delegator (until the policy of the resource owner) are examined and 
verified by generating a series of administrative requests at each level of the delegation. Finally, a 
user is granted access to the resource provided that (i) the delegation hierarchy is legitimate (i.e., it 
originates from the trusted policy that is digitally signed by the resource owner), and (ii) a user is 
granted access privileges; otherwise, system denies the access to the resource.  
Similarly, a revoke request is generated by the delegators in order to revoke access privileges 
of the tenants. As a result, the target policy and its chain of ascending policies in the hierarchy are 
verified. In case the request is genuine, the system revokes further delegations, and deletes the 
instances from the ontology-based workflow.  
5.2.4 Policy Conflicts  
Within a delegation workflow (especially if it is defined within a distributed environment 
involving heterogeneous entities such as the cloud), there could be cases in which the rules of the 
policies contradict each other: 
1. A user has access policies issued by two different subjects on a common resource, where one 
policy permits the access to the resource while the other one denies it. For example, in an 
organization, an employee is working in two different departments, where one department 
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denies access to a particular resource and the other department grants access to the same 
resource. 
2. A user has two policies issued by two different subjects on a common resource, where one 
policy contains an access policy that only allows her to access to the resource, whereas the 
other policy contains an administrative policy that delegates access rights to issue policies on 
the same resource. For example, in an organization, an employee is working on two different 
departments, where one department allows the user to only access a particular resource and 
the other department grants access rights to further delegate them to other users on the 
delegated resource. 
The above mentioned policy conflicts are automatically handled by the policy combining 
algorithm (which is formalized in Section 5.3.4), and it does not require any other rule or 
constraints specifications for these situations (as practiced in [Sohr, 2012, Ruan, 2014]).  
Our system handles policy conflicts between two or more delegators according to their 
positions in the delegation workflow; that is, preceding delegators are priority, because they can 
revoke privileges to their subsequent delegators. If delegators have the same level of delegation, 
the policy that holds the strictest rule is implemented.  
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Figure 5.4 Example of policy conflict 
The above mentioned conflict scenarios are illustrated in Figure 5.4, where several policies 
contradict the rules of each other. Regarding conflict ‘1’, dept1 (an instance of object class) has 
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two policies (in policy sets P0 and P1) on a common resource e-mail service by the delegators 
org-1 and CSP1. Let say that the policy in P0 grants access to dept1 on resource e-mail service 
and org-1 denies access to the same resource in P1. When the employees of dept1 perform an 
access request, the conflict between policies in P0 and P1 is resolved by comparing the 
precedence of the delegators. In a given scenario, the policy in P0 is given priority over policy in 
P1 due to its precedence over P1 and the employee of dept1 is given access to the desired 
resource. 
Regarding conflict ‘2’, dept1 grants access to Alice on the resource printing service (by 
defining P3), and dept2 denies access on the same resource in policy P4. During the access 
request by the Alice, the precedence of the issuing authorities of P3 and P4 are checked (i.e., dept1 
and dept2, respectively). In this case, the precedence of dept1 and dept2 is the same; therefore, the 
policy that has the strictest rule, that is P3 (deny), will be implemented. 
5.3 Delegation Enforcement in the Cloud 
In order to support access control delegation in cloud scenarios, cloud entities need to be 
categorized according to their roles and the type of services they provide. The purpose of this 
categorization is to manage the delegation within the cloud service levels (i.e., IaaS, PaaS and 
SaaS) and to provide an infrastructure for the management of the policies within these levels. 
Accordingly, there are three main entities that manage cloud resources: (i) the cloud provider (e.g., 
Google); (ii) cloud service providers (e.g., Gmail, Google drive, etc.); and (iii) tenants (e.g., 
organizations or local users using the cloud services). Cloud providers provide infrastructure (e.g., 
servers, storage, etc.) to the CSPs. Likewise, CSPs provide platforms or services/applications to 
tenants. Finally, tenants, who are the actual consumers of the cloud services, can also manage 
shared services with other users (e.g., users/departments within the organization). 
In order to provide a decentralized delegation, these entities must have distributed local 
repositories to store their policies so that they manage their resources independently. The purpose 
of this distribution is to provide a mechanism for decentralizing the authority to reduce the 
overhead of the policy management by a single entity. The flow of the delegation and the 
management of the policies within the cloud entities are shown in Figure 5.5: 
• In the first layer of the delegation, the cloud provider (CP) can delegate its resources to the 
CSPs by storing their policies in its local repository. In this repository, the CP manages 
policy sets for each shared resource and each policy set contains the policies (i.e., access 
policies or administrative policies) of all the entities that share a common resource.  
• Similarly, in the second layer, the entities manage access rights on resources (e.g., the 
services owned by the CSPs or the delegated resources by the CP) by maintaining policies in 
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the local repository managed by the CSPs. The CSPs can delegate resources to other CSPs 
(on the same level e.g., in a federated cloud scenario) or to the tenants of the cloud (i.e., third 
level entities) by maintaining policy sets. 
• The third layer of tenants manages resources that are delegated by the CSPs, which can 
further delegate (provided the delegated policies allow them to do so) to other tenants by 
maintaining their own policies.  
As the storage space is managed and shared by the CP, the entities (at each level of delegation) 
can use the same space to store their policies but they can independently manage their local 
repositories. Even though the repositories are managed in a distributed way, the system can couple 
all the entities through a common delegation workflow. Thus, as a result of an access request 
generated at any level by the entities, the delegator’s authority can easily be verified by following 
the common delegation workflow. 
 
Figure 5.5 Delegation and management of policies within cloud entities 
For this purpose, the workflow generated as a result of the delegation process needs to be 
trusted to avoid the forgery of the identities of the delegators. To develop this trust, the owner of 
the resources digitally signs its policies, which are referred as trusted policies. The purpose of the 
trusted policy is to provide a reliable mechanism to validate the delegators’ authority on each 
access request to a resource. To do so, the delegation workflow needs to be originated from the 
trusted policy that is digitally signed by the owner of the resource. 
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In the cloud, the CP and the CSPs can be the owners of the cloud resources/services, thus, the 
policies written by them are the trusted policies (i.e., all the policies of a policy set). A CP 
delegates infrastructure to the CSPs and the CSPs, in turn, offer infrastructure-based services to 
other CSPs or tenants. In this situation, we consider CSPs as the owners of the services; thus, the 
trusted policies of the CSPs are considered. The trusted policies of the CP are only considered 
during the verification of the authority of the access request by the CSPs. We assume that the 
resources and their owners are registered in a trusted third party (i.e., certification authority), 
which provides verified information on request (e.g., keys, certificates, etc). In the cloud, this 
certification authority can reside with the CP or it can be any other reliable trusted third party 
certificate provider (e.g., Verisign). The CP is responsible to acquire certificates for CSPs and it 
would originate revoke requests in case the delegation needs to be revoked.   
In a trusted policy, the identity of the owner (which can be a name or an ID) is digitally signed 
(using a private key) by the owner and stored as an attribute within the trusted policy; this process 
is only performed by the owners. Within this scenario it is not possible for any attacker to forge 
identities to perform unauthorized delegations. Moreover, due to ontological relationships between 
the users, resources and their policies, it will be difficult for other users to forge their identities as 
delegatees. As a result of the access request, the authority of the delegator that issued the access 
policy to the requester is validated by following the flow of the delegated policies that leads to the 
owner of the policy (i.e., from the requester’s access policy with all intermediate delegator’s 
policies). Then, it is verified by using a public key of the owner of the policy that is provided by 
the certification authority. As a result, the requester is granted or denied access to the resource if 
the delegation is genuine..The mechanism we propose is more reliable than the one implemented 
in the current XACML profile, in which a policy is considered trusted if it does not contain a 
policy issuer element in it, which can be can be forged easily (i.e., a user can spoof its identity to 
gain access to the cloud resources). 
The following subsections detail the processes of delegation of authority, verification of 
authority and revocation of authority through several proposed algorithms. Moreover, the policy 
combining algorithm depicts the method to resolve policy conflicts in case of multiple delegations 
by different delegators. 
5.3.1 Delegation of Authority 
Algorithm 1 details the process of delegation of authority from a delegator to a delegatee on a 
given resource. The request for the delegation is received by the system with the instances of the 
delegator, the delegatee and the resource that is being delegated. To process a delegation request, 
in line 1, the delegator’s authority is verified in order to check its privileges as a delegator 
(discussed in Section 5.3.2). In case that the delegator has enough delegation rights (line 2), the 
delegation process starts by establishing a connection with the local repository of policies 
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managed by the delegator (line 3). At this point, a distinction has to be made about the type of the 
delegator (i.e., owner or delegatee) in order to write the corresponding policy, that is, a trusted 
policy or a delegated policy. For this purpose, the type of the subject delegator is checked in line 
4. If the delegator is the owner of the target resource, the parameters for the trusted policy are 
prepared. To do so, the attribute of the delegation level is set (in line 5) by the owner to define the 
maximum number of delegations on the target resource. In line 6, the identity of the owner is 
digitally signed by using its private key and it is stored in the attributes of the trusted policy. In the 
case the delegator is not the owner of the resource, the delegation policy is updated by decreasing 
the delegation level of the resource for new policies (line 7-8). The system will not allow the 
delegation in case that the delegation level reaches the threshold level (i.e., the maximum level of 
delegation that was set by the owner) in order to limit number of delegations (line 19). In addition, 
the delegation policy is updated by defining a policy rule according to the access right i.e., 
intended action (e.g., read, write, etc) to be performed (line 11-18).  
 
Algorithm 1:          DelegationOfAuthority (subject_delegator, subject_delegatee, object_resource, action) 
1:     authority ← VerifyDelegatorAuthority(subject_delegator,object_resource, action); 
2:     if authority is valid then 
3:             establish connection with local database of subject_delegator; 
4:             if subject_delegator is the owner then 
5:                 set delegation_level; // e.g. default value is ‘5’; 
6:                 prepare trusted policy by signing an attribute of the owner; 
7:             else    prepare delegated policy; 
8:                       delegation_level = Delegation_level -1; 
9:             end if 
10:           if  delegation_level is greater than zero then 
11:                  create new policy_rule for the subject_delegatee;                        
12:                  define new policy by adding policy_rule and delegation_level; 
13:                  if subject_delegator has policySet for the object_resource then             
14:                       add policy to the existing policySet; 
15:                  else     create new policySet; 
16:                              add policy to the policySet; end if 
17:                  store policySet in the local database of the subject delegator;  
18:                  CreateInstanceRelations (subject_delegator, subject_delegatee, object_resource,   
                                 policySet);                  
19:           else object_resource reached maximum limit of delegation; end if 
20:               else    not a valid delegator;  end if 
 
After that, the policy is created by adding a policy rule for the delegatee and by updating the 
delegation level for the resource (line 12). Before the authorization, the system examines the 
delegator’s repository for a policy set defined for the target resource (line 13). If a policy set 
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
44 
 
already exists, the new policy is added to the existing policy set of the delegator (line 14). 
Otherwise, a new policy set is created for the delegator and the policy is added to it (lines 15-16). 
Once the delegation policy is created and stored in the repository of delegator (line 17), the 
delegation workflow is generated by instantiating the corresponding ontological classes (delegator, 
delegatee, delegated resource and policy set) and the corresponding relationships (line 18).   
5.3.2 Verification of Authority 
The authority verification starts as a result of an access request generated by the requester that 
accesses a resource. As illustrated in Figure 5.1(c), the access request contains the identity of the 
requester, the intended resource and the action that needs to be performed on that resource. 
Algorithm 2 processes this access request by considering these elements in order to verify the 
delegation authority that granted the access rights (i.e., the intended action) to the requester on the 
resource.  
Due to the fact that policies are managed by the delegators themselves, they can only be 
retrieved from the database through the delegator’s instances. Therefore, (in line 2) the process 
starts by determining the instances of the delegators (from the ontology-based workflow generated 
during the delegation process i.e., in Algorithm 1) that have issued policies to the requestor 
regardless of the requested resource. For example, in Figure 5.4, as a result of an access request by 
the employees working in dept1, the instances of org-1 and CSP1 will be retrieved. Thus, the 
interrelations of each delegator’s instance are parsed one by one (in line 3) in order to get the 
appropriate delegator that has issued a policy to the requester on the given resource. To do so, the 
policy instance that is written for the corresponding delegator instance is determined (in line 4), 
which is also connected to the instances of the target resource and the requester within the 
workflow (e.g., in Figure 5.4, P2 connects org-1 (delegator), printing service (resource) and dept1 
(delegatee)). Then, in line 5, the Policy set is retrieved from the policy repository through the 
policy instance that is already determined. The policy set repository is managed by the delegator 
but the relationship of the policy instance with the delegators instance makes it possible to retrieve 
it from the delegator’s repository. From the policy set, the policy issued to the requester is 
searched in line 6. If the policy exists for the requester the rule is matched with the requested 
action; if not, the same process is repeated for the other delegator instances (lines 7-9). In the next 
step, the authority of the delegator is verified in case that the requested action (e.g., read request or 
write request) matches with the delegated access rights stored as a policy rule (line 9-16). Once the 
authority of the delegator is verified, the decision to grant or deny access to the resource is made 
(lines 17-19). 
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Algorithm 2:      AccessRequest (subject_requester, object_resource, action) 
1: policyFound = false; 
2: subjectInstances ← get all subject instances connected with the policy instance of the   
                subject_requester from ontology-based delegation workflow; 
3: while  there are subjectInstances to parse and policyFound is false do  
4:           policyInstance ← get policy instance related to object_resource that connects  
                          subjectInstance and subject_requester through the ontology-based workflow; 
5:           policySet ← get policy set related to object_resource through policyInstance from the  
                          policy repository; 
6:           policy ← get policy issued to subject_requester;  
7:           if policy is valid then 
8:                 rule ← read rule of the policy; 
9:                 if rule matches with the action then 
10:                       authority = VerifyDelegationAuthority (subjectInstance, object_resource, action); 
11:                       if authority is valid then 
12:                              policyFound = true;                                
13:                       end if 
14:                 end if              
15:           end if 
16: end while 
17: if policyFound is true and authority is valid then 
18:        grant Access; 
19:           else deny access; end if 
 
Algorithm-3 shows the process of verifying the delegator’s authority. It receives three 
parameters: (i) subject (a delegator that needs to be verified), (ii) resource and (iii) action (that 
contains the granted access rights by the delegator). In line 2, the instances of the subject’s 
predecessor that have issued policies related to the target resource are determined (e.g., in Figure 
5.4, org-1 and CSP1 are the predecessors of dept1) and (in line 3) the same process of backward 
chaining is repeated for the predecessors at each delegation level. This recursive process is 
repeated to determine the rules of predecessors of each subject until the owner is found (lines 4-7).  
Besides, the authority of each delegator (at each level of delegation) is verified by consulting their 
access privileges within the rules of the policies, which are issued to them by their predecessors 
(lines 8-12). Thus, if the primary subject (i.e., the issuer of the policy to the requester) has a path 
of delegation interrelations that connects with the owner, the signature of the owner is verified 
using her public key (lines 13-24). At the end, the decision is made in the form of valid or invalid 
authority of the primary subject (line 25).  
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Algorithm 3:      VerifyDelegatorAuthority (subject, object_resource, action) 
1: subInstances ← get all subject instances connected to the policy instances of the  
                object_resource that are connected to the subject from the ontology-based workflow;  
2: while there are subjectInstance to parse do  
3:            policyInstance ← get subject’s policy instance connected to the owner’s instance from  
                           the ontology; 
4:            policySet ← get policy set through policyInstance from the database; 
5:            policy ← get policy issued to subjectInstance from the policySet;  
6:            rule ← get rule from the policy; 
7:            if subjectInstance is NOT the owner then 
8:                  if rule matches with the action then 
9:                        authority ← VerifyDelegatorAuthority (subjectInstance,object_resource,action); 
10:                  else authority = ‘invalid’; 
11:                        continue with other subjectInstances; end if 
12:           else                    
13:               if rule matches with the action then 
14:                         signature ← verify identity of the owner using her public key; 
15:                         if signature is valid then 
16:                             authority = ‘valid’; 
17:                             end while; 
18:                             return authority; 
19:                         else authority = ‘invalid’; 
20:                         end if 
21:                  else authority = ‘invalid’; 
22:                         continue with other subjectInstances; end if 
23:           end if 
24: end while  
25:           return authority; 
5.3.3 Revocation of Authority 
The delegator can revoke the delegated access rights by generating a revoke request. In Algorithm 
4, the system handles this request by examining the instances of the delegator, delegatee, and the 
privilege being revoked on the given resource. To do so, the authority of the delegator is verified 
in order to ensure that the delegator has issued the policy to the delegatee and that it is capable of 
performing the operation (lines 1-5). As a result of valid request, the delegated policy is removed 
from the policy set and it is also updated in the repository of policies (lines 6-8 and 10). Moreover, 
the policy instance is deleted in the case that the policy set does not hold any other policy (line 9).  
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Algorithm 4:     RevokeDelegatorAuthority (subject_delegator, subject_delegatee, object_resource, action) 
1: authority ← VerifyDelegatorAuthority (subject_delegator,object_resource,action); 
2: policyInstance ← get subject_delegator’s policy instance from ontological workflow; 
3: policySet ← get policy set through policyInstance from database; 
4: policy ← get policy issued to subjectInstance from the policySet; 
5: rule ← get rule from the policy; 
6: if authority is valid & rule matches with the action then 
7:       delete policy issued to subject_delegatee from policy set; 
8:       if policy set is empty then 
9:               delete policyInstance; 
10:       else update policy set in database; end if 
11:           else invalid request; end if 
5.3.4 Policy Combining Algorithm 
As discussed in section 5.2.4, the policy combining algorithm is invoked if there is a conflict 
within the policies. In such case, the policies are matched in order to find the precedence in the 
ontology-based delegation workflow. Algorithm 5 implements this task and receives the instances 
of the conflicting policies: the subject for whom the conflict occurred (i.e., delegatee) and the 
conflicting resource. First, the policy sets related to the conflicting resource are retrieved from the 
policy database through the policy instances of the delegator subjects (lines 1-2). From both policy 
sets, the delegation level of the policies is determined and matched in order to decide which policy 
should be implemented (lines 3-11).    
 
Algorithm 5:      PolicyCombiningAlgorithm (policyInstance1,  policyInstance2, subject_delegatee,  
                             object_resource) 
1: policySet1 ← get policy set from policy database using  policyInstance1 instance for  
                object_resource; 
2: policySet2 ← get policy set from policy database using policyInstance2 instance for  
                object_resource; 
3: if policySet1 and policySet2 are valid then 
4:        policy1 ← get policy from policySet1 issued to subject_delegatee; 
5:        policy2 ← get policy from policySet2 issued to subject_delegatee; 
6:        DL1 ← get delegation level of policy1; 
7:        DL2 ← get delegation level of policy2; 
8:        if DL1 is greater than DL2 then 
9:              return policyInstance1; 
10:        else return policyInstance2; end if 
11:             else invalid policies; end if 
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5.4 Performance Evaluation 
As discussed in section 5.2, the main practical benefit of our ontology-based delegation workflow 
is the improvement of the performance of the XACML delegation profile. Contrary to the 
XACML profile, our approach overcomes the cost of generating the delegation graph on each 
access request for a resource; instead, a delegation workflow is generated and updated on each 
delegation of access rights. Moreover, each delegator maintains a separate policy set in order to 
manage access rights for the delegatees on a given resource, which also improves the performance 
of the policy search during the authority verification process. In order to measure the performance 
of our system, in this section, we study: (i) the computation complexity of our algorithms; and (ii) 
the cost of searching policies from the policy sets and generating a graph for performing the 
verification of authority. We also compare these costs with the cost of the policy management 
activities of the standard XACML profile.    
5.4.1 Verification of Authority 
In order to process an access request in the XACML profile, the following two tasks are 
performed: (i) a graph of policies is generated; and (ii) the authority of the delegation is verified 
using that graph. To generate the graph, the policies within the policy set are compared on each 
request by matching the credentials of the access request or the delegators with the elements of the 
policies. As a result, the corresponding delegated flow is represented as a policy graph. Therefore, 
in the worst case, N policies are compared on each request to find the requester’s policy or the 
delegator’s policy in order to generate the delegation graph. On the other hand, and also in the 
worst case, it would be required to evaluate N edges (to check whether the policies either permit or 
deny the delegation) in order to verify the authority. Therefore, the overall cost of this process is 
O(2N). 
Contrary to the XACML profile, our approach does not incur in any graph generation cost at 
the time of an access request, because the workflow is automatically generated during the access 
control delegation process by the corresponding authorities. The verification process is divided 
into two steps, the first step processes the access request and the second one verifies the authority 
of the delegator. Processing an access request requires finding an appropriate delegator from the 
already available workflow; this is done by getting all the n nodes connected to the requestor 
(where n<N) and determining the one related to the requested resource. It is important to note that 
matching nodes in the workflow is also less expensive than searching policies from the repository 
(as done in the XACML profile). Moreover, n is usually much smaller than N, because N is the 
total number of policies managed by all delegators irrespective of delegatees, and n is the number 
of delegator nodes that delegated resources only to the intended delegatee. Once the search is 
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completed, the chosen delegator is verified from the delegation workflow, which is achieved by 
following the workflow that already exists. For this purpose, the delegator and its predecessor 
delegators are verified from the delegation workflow. The number of these delegator nodes can be 
considered constant, because they will be lower than the maximum delegation level l set by the 
owner (i.e., the maximum number of delegations permitted on a given resource). Thus, the 
computation cost of both of these processes (i.e., searching and verifying) is, in the worst case, 
n+l. As l is a constant and bounded number, the cost of the resulting computation is just O(n), 
with n<<N in most cases. 
In terms of policies, contrary to the XACML profile that requires the evaluation of N policies 
in the worst case, our system verifies only those policies that are relevant to the delegator and its 
predecessors. Thus, the number of evaluated policies cannot exceed delegation level l set by the 
owner of the resource, because a resource cannot be shared more times than specified. Therefore, 
in the worst case, the number of policies that are compared is constant. 
5.4.2 Delegation of Authority  
The delegation algorithm is divided into three steps: (i) verification of the delegation authority; (ii) 
instantiation and interlinking of the entities in the delegation workflow; and (iii) storage of the 
policy in the database. As discussed above, the verification process evaluates n nodes to verify the 
authority, whereas the instantiation and interlinking of entities evaluate a fixed number of nodes 
(i.e., the delegatee, the policy set and the resource being delegated) which takes constant time in 
any case. Similarly, the storage of the policy set in the database is also constant and depends on 
the processing time of the machine. Therefore, in the worst case, the cost of the delegation 
algorithm is O(n) for any given delegation request. On the other hand, the XACML profile 
requires O(2N) for verification (as explained above) and a constant time to store it in the database. 
5.4.3 Revocation of Authority 
The revocation process has two steps: (i) verification of the authority of the issuer of the 
revocation request; and (ii) retrieval of the related policy and deletion of instances from the 
delegation workflow. As above, the cost of verification is O(n), whereas accessing the related 
policy and deleting node takes constant time; as a result, the overall cost remains O(n). On the 
other hand, the cost of the XACML profile to verify the authority (as above) is O(2N), whereas the 
retrieval and deletion of policy can be done in constant time. Therefore, the overall cost of the 
revocation process for the XACML profile is O(2N). 
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5.4.4 Experimental Analysis 
In order to evaluate the practical performance of our system, we have implemented our ontology 
and the proposed algorithms and compared it with the XACML delegation profile within several 
scenarios and policy loads. The test environment uses Windows 7 professional (64-bit) OS and has 
the following hardware specifications: Intel core i-5 CPU, 4 GB RAM and 500 GB hard disk 
drive. We have used Java and the OWL API to create and manipulate the ontology, which is 
written in the standard Ontology Web Language (OWL). 
The main task involved in the verification and revocation processes is to find the target policy. 
Thus, we considered this task the core of the empirical analysis in both systems (i.e., our ontology-
based one and the XACML profile).   
Because the XACML delegation profile generates a policy graph modeling the delegation 
workflow on each access request, it requires repeated accesses to the policy database to create that 
workflow (i.e., one for each delegation level). As stated above, the cost of searching for a policy is 
proportional to the size of the database (i.e., the total number of policies N stored in it). According 
to [Turkmen, 2008], in a standard implementation of XACML, the policy decision point, PDP, 
(i.e., the module that makes access decisions on a given access request) requires 4 seconds in a 
similar execution environment as ours to search for a target policy from a database containing 
10,000 policies; that is, 0.4 milliseconds for a database containing only one policy. Thus, the 
overall cost of the process associated to an access request is proportional to the cost of the policy 
search (i.e., N x 0.4 ms) multiplied by the total number of delegator nodes n to be evaluated. This 
corresponds to the repeated accesses to the database for each delegated node that is needed to 
generate the graph. For example, if there are N=10 policies stored in the database and the number 
of delegator nodes related to a request is n=5, then the system requires 20 ms (i.e., (10*0.4)*5) to 
process the request.  
On the contrary, our system does not require searching for policies in the database of policies, 
but just following the delegation workflow that has been already generated by instantiating the 
ontology. Thus, it does not incur in the cost of searching for policies in a, potentially large, 
database; that is, its cost is independent of the size of the database (N), bust just of the number of 
delegator nodes (n). 
Figure 5.6 depicts the actual runtime required to process an access request in both systems for 
several policy database sizes (N), as a function of the number of delegator nodes (n). Results show 
that the runtime of the XACML profile significantly increases as the size of the policy database 
increases. On the other hand, our ontology-based system is not affected by the size of the database, 
but just on the number of delegator nodes to be evaluated within the workflow. Thus, the runtime 
is constant for different database sizes. In practice, and for large databases (i.e., N>1000), the 
difference in performance between our system and the XACML profile accounts several orders of 
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
51 
 
magnitude, which is illustrated by the log10 runtime scale that we used for the Y-axis. Thus, our 
system provides better scalability in crowded scenarios as the cloud. 
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Figure 5.6 Runtime of the XACML profile and our ontology-based system  
for several policy database sizes (N) 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we proposed a delegation enforcement mechanism that enhances the XACML 
delegation profile by relying on an ontological modeling of the delegation workflow. As a result, 
the processes of delegation, verification and revocation are managed in a more scalable way, 
which is of great importance in crowded environments such as the cloud. Contrary to the XACML 
profile, our proposal does not require generating a graph on each access request and only those 
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policies that are relevant to the entities of the delegation are evaluated for the verification of 
authority; this provides a more efficient solution for cloud environments where entities are 
numerous, heterogeneous and distributed. Moreover, the size of the policies database does not 
hamper the performance of the proposed system. In addition, it does not require defining special 
rules (as needed by some related work [Sohr, 2012]) for the enforcement of the delegation 
policies, since this is automatically achieved by the proposed algorithms, which rely on the 
coherence of the ontology-based delegation workflow. Thanks to this coherency, the policy 
conflicts within the policy rules are also automatically handled by an intuitive algorithm. 
Moreover, we also provide CSPs with the ability to limit the number of delegation levels on a 
delegated resource; this provides an improved control on the delegation process. Finally, the 
system is also capable of detecting forged identities by providing a mechanism to digitally sign 
policies by the owners of the resource. 
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Chapter 6 Privacy-driven Access Control by Means of 
Ontology-based Semantic Annotation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Social media are open platforms that allow users to interact and exchange information. OSNs have 
been particularly successfully in the recent years and have attracted many internet users 
[PewResearchCenter, 2010], who have produced and published vast amounts of (personal) data. 
As mentioned in chapter 4 (section 4.3), these publically shared data may contain sensitive 
information, and thus, they require proper access control management in order to guarantee the 
privacy of the individuals. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the efforts made by the 
research community to protect the access to sensitive resources made available through social 
media (and OSNs in particular). Then, we propose an automatic content and privacy-driven 
solution to manage the access control to these resources that overcome most of the shortcoming of 
current solutions. 
In the last few years, OSNs (such as Facebook) introduced some measures to improve users’ 
privacy by implementing access control features. In order to incorporate such access control, the 
user profile is broken down into small customizable elements [Aïmeur, 2010]. In order to manage 
the access to related resources, the information can be classified as “public”, “private”, “friend” or 
“friend of friend” [Cheng, 2012a]. According to Aïmeur et al. [Aïmeur, 2010], these features are 
unreliable or fail to provide desirable results, because they are not fully understood [Eecke, 2010] 
or it is difficult for the users to manage them correctly [Johnson, 2012]. Furthermore, while 
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configuring privacy settings, users need to perform a tedious job of defining policies for each user, 
type of resource and to classify those resources. 
In order to overcome these shortcomings, the scientific community has proposed some access 
control solutions (Masoumzadeh et al [Masoumzadeh, 2010b] & Carminati et al. [Carminati, 
2009,2011]) that take into consideration the type of resources to be protected (e.g., photos, videos, 
wall messages, etc.) before allowing/rejecting an access request. These methods rely on ad-hoc 
structures (i.e., application ontologies) that provide a preliminary modeling of the resources. In 
order to manage the access control, the users or the OSN administrators need to define access 
control rules for each resource type. The proposed solutions bear some limitations. On one hand, 
the classification of resources is coarse grained, fixed and rigid. Similarly, access control policies 
are applied as a whole on the object or resource, regardless of their actual contents or 
sensitiveness. As a result, the access to the resource is binary, that is, complete access or complete 
restriction. For example, if a user declares WallMessages as private for a special group of friends, 
all the published messages will be hidden from that category of friends, regardless the messages 
contain any sensitive information or not. Furthermore, it is usually difficult for the users to 
configure the access control policies, since they may not be familiar with such notations and 
privacy issues. 
In order to address the limitations introduced above, in this chapter, we present a new 
ontology-based scheme [Imran-Daud, 2016b] to enforce access control over content-based 
resources published in social networks. Ontologies are particularly helpful to analyze and 
understand the semantics of the published content. Moreover, they are also helpful to identify the 
sensitive content that may hamper privacy of the publisher. We next summarize the main 
contributions of our work: 
 
• We propose a transparent, dynamic and privacy-driven access control mechanism. Privacy is 
ensured by automatically protecting the content of messages to be published according to the 
privacy requirements of the publishers. The privacy requirements are defined by stating the 
type of information and the level of detail that is allowed to be accessed by each type of 
publisher’s contact within the OSN. Contrary to access control policies defined over specific 
resources, such requirements are only defined once in a generic way and can be intuitively 
stated. Moreover, the user does not need to have a priori privacy notions. 
• Contrary to solutions [Masoumzadeh, 2010b, Masoumzadeh, 2010a] [Carminati, 2011], the 
privacy assessment is performed by semantically analyzing the contents to be published in an 
automatic way. Moreover, instead of evaluating the privacy for a resource (e.g., a 
publication) as a whole, our approach examines the privacy risk of each part of the resource 
individually (i.e., each textual term in a message). 
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• The semantics that drive the privacy assessment are gathered by means of an automatic 
semantic annotation process, which relies on available ontological knowledge bases (i.e., 
DBPedia5) and several linguistic tools. 
• In contrast to the binary access control policies proposed by other researchers (which just 
completely allow or deny the access to a resource), our access control enforcement provides 
each type of reader with a sanitized version of the original publication that is coherent with 
the privacy requirements specified by the publisher for that type of reader. The different 
sanitized versions are semantically coherent with regard to the original publication, and are 
created automatically according to the semantic annotation process and the privacy risk 
assessment.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2 we present our access control 
mechanism and give a detailed description of its different components and how potential policy 
conflicts are managed. Section 6.3 illustrates the feasibility of the proposal through a real example. 
In section 6.4, we evaluate the system, under the perspectives of feasibility, scalability and 
accuracy of the privacy protection. Finally, in section 6.5 we provide conclusions of this work. 
 
The content of this chapter has been published in: 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2016), Privacy-driven access control in social 
networks by means of automatic semantic annotation, Computer Communications, 
Volume 76, 15 February 2016, Pages 12-25, ISSN 0140-3664, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2016.01.001. 
6.2 Our Proposal  
As shown in figure 6.1, the actors involved in our system are the publisher of a message, the 
reader of that message and the social network, which provides the framework. The publisher is 
responsible for specifying her privacy requirements and to publish data in the social network. The 
reader is the one who initiates a request for accessing to the published content; as a result, he gets 
a sanitized version of the publication in coherence with the publisher’s privacy requirements with 
regard to him. The social network is in charge of controlling the whole process by (i) semantically 
annotating the messages submitted for publication and (ii) enforcing publisher’s privacy by 
creating semantically-coherent sanitized versions of the published content according to the type of 
reader. To tackle these tasks, two components are incorporated, respectively, in the social 
                                                          
5
 http://dbpedia.org/About 
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network: the annotator and the monitor. The following workflow of the system is explained with 
regard to figure 6.1.  
In order to define her privacy requirements, the publisher specifies the level of content 
disclosure allowed for each type of contact in the social network in a generic way (e.g., only 
family contacts can know her sexual orientation). These requirements are stored as privacy rules 
(e.g., Pr1, Pr2…….Prn), which are associated to each publisher in the privacy rule database that is 
managed by the social network. The specification of the privacy requirements of each potential 
publisher is a process that is performed once, at the deployment stage of the system; afterwards, 
the system applies them for all of her future publications. The details of this process are explained 
in section 6.2.2.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 System architecture 
Once the privacy requirements are specified, the subsequent workflow of the proposed system 
is as follows. For a message m to be published by the publisher u1, the annotator module analyses 
the text of the message by performing syntactic and semantic analyses in order to identify and 
semantically annotate the content. The resulting annotated message mo is stored in the annotated 
content database within the social network. The annotation methodology of the annotator module 
is elaborated in section 6.2.1. After that, when a reader u2 requests a message m of the publisher 
u1, the request is evaluated by the monitor module. The monitor assesses the content sensitiveness 
of the annotated version of the requested message (mo), with respect to the privacy requirements 
defined by the publisher u1, which are retrieved from the privacy rules database. As a result, the 
monitor sanitizes the sensitive content of a message according to the level of disclosure allowed 
by the publisher (u1) for the type of reader’s contact (i.e., u2) with respect to the publisher. The 
resulting sanitized message (m′) is finally forwarded to the reader u2. The details of the monitor 
module are explained in section 6.2.2. 
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6.2.1 Submitting a Message for Publication 
The annotator module is invoked whenever the publisher sends a message m to be published by 
the social network. The message contents are processed by the annotator module in order to 
perform the semantic annotation process. The formal semantics associated to the message content 
during the annotation are used in a later step to evaluate the sensitiveness of a publication, because 
our sensitiveness assessment is driven by the content of the message. 
Within a discourse, nouns are the part of speech that provides the richest semantics and usually 
carry the sensitive content [Sánchez, 2013a]. Therefore, the annotator module identifies the terms 
that are nouns from a given message, and then derives their semantics by associating them with a 
formal conceptualization. Since words may have multiple senses, there is a need to resolve the 
ambiguity by choosing the appropriate word sense that corresponds to the actual semantics of a 
message. Consequently, the annotator module also performs a word sense disambiguation to 
select the most appropriate sense in order to semantically annotate nouns. The activity diagram in 
figure 6.2 depicts the workflow of the annotator module that is explained in the following 
paragraphs. 
Two different types of nouns that potentially carry sensitive data are distinguished: (i) proper 
nouns (usually referred as named entities (NEs)), which are instances of concepts (e.g., person 
names, locations, etc.); and (ii) common nouns that refer to concepts (e.g., a sensitive disease, a 
sexual orientation, etc.). The former are especially relevant from the privacy-preserving 
perspective, because their specificity and the fact that they usually identify an individual (e.g., a 
person) may produce a privacy leak. In order to identify them, we rely on a Named Entity 
Recognition package [Finkel, 2005], which is able to identify named entities and classify them 
into seven categories: Time, Location, Organization, Person, Money, Percent and Date. Since this 
package relies on the lexical regularities of named entities (e.g., they are usually expressed with 
capital letters), rather than on the syntactical structure of a sentence, no priori analysis is needed to 
detect them. As a result of this process, the annotator module stores the tagged NEs and passes the 
remaining text of the message for further processing. 
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Figure 6.2 Semantic annotation activity diagram 
The second step of the annotation process consists on a Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging of the 
remaining text, which aims at identifying the common nouns potentially referring to sensitive 
topics (e.g., sensitive diseases). For this purpose, our system relies on a set of natural language 
processing libraries [OpenNLP, 2010], which perform sentence detection, tokenization of terms, 
POS tagging and chunking. As a result of this step, noun phrases are identified. 
In the next step, a Semantic Analysis is performed over the set of noun phrases provided by the 
POS tagging module. This consists in deriving the meanings of noun phrases by associating them 
with the concepts to which they refer in the message, which will serve as semantic annotation tags. 
To do so, our system relies on an ontological knowledge base DBPedia [Lehmann, 2014], which 
provides a taxonomically structured representation of Wikipedia articles (called resources). Within 
DBPedia, the resources are classified into several ontologies such as the Wikipedia categories, 
YAGO and WordNet [Lehmann, 2014]. By exploring the classifications associated to a resource, 
we are able to associate a conceptualization to the noun phrases identified in the message that 
match with such resources. 
In order to explore these classifications, we exploit the ontological properties of DBPedia 
resources that map them with each other based on their common categories. To do so, we use 
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SPARQL [W3C-SPARQL, 2013] as a query language and the Semantic Web API [Jena, 2014] for 
its implementation. Accordingly, the SPARQL query is customized in the following order:  
 
i. First it determines the DBPedia resources that contain a noun phrase identified in the 
message as a substring in its title (e.g., for a noun phrase like Apple we can have DBPedia 
resources such as Apple, Apple_inc, Apple_iOS, etc). 
ii. Then, for each resource determined in step one; it derives a list of other resources that are 
linked with them on the basis of their relational properties (e.g., Apple ingredient_of 
Fruit, Apple_inc developer Mac_OS, where ingredient_of and developer are the 
properties and their ranges are other resources). As a result, an extended list of resources 
is gathered, which includes the resources that are semantically related to those retrieved 
in step-i by simple keyword matching. With this step, we aim to extend the number of 
possible conceptualizations of the noun phrase, which will be useful to derive the 
semantics of the noun phrase in the message and, thus, to annotate it. 
iii. Finally, the system determines the Wikipedia categories of the resources gathered in step-
ii (e.g., Wikipedia categories for Apple are: Apples, Malus, Plants with sequenced 
genomes and Honey plants, whereas, categories for Apple_Inc are: Apple Inc, Computer 
companies of the United States, Computer hardware companies, Electronics companies, 
Steve Jobs and others). 
As a result of the semantic analysis, a set of possible conceptualizations (i.e., each one 
representing a word sense) and their taxonomic categories are retrieved for each noun phrase. If 
several conceptualizations have been retrieved, the most appropriate one (according to the sense) 
to which the noun phrase is referring within the message should be determined (e.g., for an 
ambiguous noun phrase like Apple we get conceptualizations like Fruit and Apple_inc). To 
perform the Semantic Disambiguation, our system uses the other noun phrases in the message as 
contextual information. Specifically, it calculates the semantic similarity of all senses retrieved for 
all noun phrases, and selects the combination of senses (one for each noun phrase) that are, in 
aggregate, the most semantically similar with each other. This strategy relies on the hypothesis 
that, to be semantically coherent, the senses of the noun phrases appearing in a sentence should 
refer to a common topic (i.e., they should be semantically similar). This is in fact the premise of 
most semantic disambiguation approaches proposed in the literature (developed around the 
senseval initiative [Kilgarriff, 2000]), which exploit the context of a term to identify its 
appropriate sense. 
To compute the semantic similarity between senses, our system relies on the taxonomic 
structure of DBPedia. Because the semantic similarity between two concepts is understood as their 
degree of taxonomic resemblance [Batet, 2014] (e.g., flu and pneumonia are similar because both 
are respiratory disorders), semantic similarity is usually computed as a function of the 
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commonalities and/or differences between their taxonomic ancestors [Harispe, 2014]. Specifically, 
in Sánchez et al. [Sánchez, 2012] the authors propose to measure the semantic distance (i.e., the 
inverse to similarity) between two concepts a and b, as the ratio between the number of taxonomic 
ancestors (T(a) and T(b)) that they do not share (as an indication of distance), divided by the union 
of both ancestors’ sets (to normalize values to the size of the sets of ancestors). The logarithmic 
function is used as non-linear smoothing of the differences between the compared concepts (which 
better correlates with human assessment of similarities/distances), and the (1+) factor is added 
within the expression to avoid Log(0) calculations (i.e., in case of synonyms with identical sets of 
ancestors) and to ensure that the distance is within the [0..1] range [Sánchez, 2012]:   
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By applying this measure (eq. 2.1) to all pairs of senses amongst all the possible combinations 
of senses retrieved from DBPedia for the noun phrases identified in the message, we can 
identify/disambiguate the most appropriate combination of senses as the one that, in aggregate, 
results in the smallest semantic distance (i.e., the highest similarity). As a result, each noun phrase 
is semantically annotated with the conceptualization associated to the disambiguated sense. The 
result of the semantic annotation is stored by the annotation module in the annotated content 
database. This semantic information will be the base for assessing term sensitiveness and 
performing the privacy driven access control in the next stages.  
6.2.2 Accessing a Message 
In this section, we propose an access control system for messages published in the OSN, where the 
policies are seamlessly defined by the owners of the resources, who are in charge of categorizing 
their OSN friends and specifying their allowed level of access to sensitive information. Note that 
the use of user categories is analogous to the use of roles in the well-known role-based access 
control (RBAC); therefore, our proposal can be considered to be inspired by the RBAC model but 
working in a discretional way [Sandhu, 1996]. 
Moreover, our system is flexible enough to be integrated in any OSN that implements 
publications, and it relies on existing OSN procedures in which an access request for a resource is 
monitored for authorization. To do so, our system requires a monitor module to be deployed in the 
OSN, which is responsible for the authorization of reader’s access request for any given message. 
The monitor processes each access request based on the following three inputs: (i) the annotated 
message of the publisher that a reader desires to access; (ii) the reader classification with regards 
to the publisher; and (iii) the publisher’s privacy requirements, which are defined by her to 
manage the access to her publications. 
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In order to process an access request, the monitor module retrieves the requested annotated 
message from the annotated content database. This message is annotated with three tags (i) the 
publisher of a message; (ii) the co-publisher of a message (i.e., the users who are tagged by the 
publisher in the message because the message content may refer to them); and (iii) the semantic 
annotations automatically defined by the annotator module (discussed in section 6.2.1). The 
publisher and the co-publisher tags are provided by a user who publishes the message in the social 
network (these tags are currently supported and managed by most OSNs). On the other hand, the 
semantic elements are calculated and stored in the annotated content database by the annotator 
module. 
The monitor processes an access request by annotating the reader according to the type of 
contact that he represents for the publisher. This contact type represents the nature of the 
relationship between the publisher and her contacts (e.g., close friends, family friends, etc.), which 
are defined by the publisher by following existing OSN settings and can be assigned while 
accepting a user’s request for friendship. This categorization of friends reduces the administrative 
efforts of the users that define the privacy requirements for once on the whole group of friends, 
and the access is automatically managed for all future publications. Based on this reader 
annotation, the monitor assesses and manages an access request by determining the reader’s type 
of contact with the publisher, and by applying an appropriate privacy rule that is defined by the 
publisher for that type of contact. These rules are defined according to the publisher’s privacy 
requirements, which define the level of disclosure of information for each type of contact. 
According to such requirements, the system automatically generates related rules and stores them 
in a local repository of the social network. The definition of rules is a onetime process, that is, at 
the time of creation of an account, and the system automatically manages all future access requests 
to the publisher’s messages according to these rules. The process required to retrieve the rules 
according to the privacy settings is detailed in the next section. 
6.2.2.1 Defining Access Rules According to Users’ Privacy Requirements 
An important goal of our system is to ensure the user’s privacy while minimizing her 
administrative efforts to manage access to her publications. To do so, our system facilitates the 
users to configure their privacy requirements at the time of creation of OSN account and, then, it 
automatically and seamlessly manages the access to their publications according to these 
requirements. By means of these requirements, the system defines a list of rules that contains the 
access levels of disclosure to sensitive data for the publishers’ types of contacts in the OSN. The 
following paragraphs elaborate the process of rules specification and management.  
The rules are defined according to three types of elements: (i) the sensitive topics (ST), that is, 
the type of data that are sensitive according to, for example, privacy regulations [EU, 1995]; (ii) 
the contact categories (CC), which are defined by the publisher; and (iii) the access level (AL), that 
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is, the level of sensitive information disclosure allowed for a contact type. In our approach, the 
user can choose the sensitive topics that she wants to protect from others (e.g., religion, race, 
health, etc.) from a list provided by the system. On the other hand, the user manages her OSN 
contacts by classifying them into distinct categories (as discussed in section 6.2.2). This 
categorization of friends is based on the level of trust. After that, the user defines access levels by 
providing a list of terms that represent the maximum degree of information disclosure for each 
sensitive topic and each contact category (CC). By means of that, each user can control the access 
to her sensitive data by restricting the level of information detail that will be provided to each type 
of contact. The following tuple represents an access rule. 
 
rulei ≡ < sti, cci, ali> 
 
Where, a rulei ∈ Rules has the following elements: (i) a sensitive_topic (sti), (ii) a 
contact_category (cci), and (iii) an access_level (ali). Sensitive topics ST={st1,st2,..., stn} could be 
any topic that is considered sensitive. Contact categories CC={cc1, cc2, ..., ccm} are those 
implemented by the OSN. Access levels AL= {al1, al2,..., alm} are defined by terms representing 
the maximum level of information disclosure for each element in CC. In the following paragraphs 
we discuss each element in detail. 
 
Definition 1: Sensitive topics (ST): A set of topics that are provided by the system and may be 
sensitive (e.g., according to privacy legislations) because it portrays the information about a user 
that can be misused if disclosed to others. 
 
For example, according to the European parliament and the council of the EU [EU] and the 
U.S. laws on medical data privacy [DoHNY, 2013], sensitive individual’s data is such that is 
related to medical health, religion, race, politics and sexuality. In view of that, the users can define 
their privacy rules related to these topics that are considered as sensitive topics by our system. 
 
Definition 2: Contact categories (CC): The users classify their contacts into distinct categories 
based on the level of trust. Examples of CC can be close friends, friends, family, etc., as defined by 
the OSN. 
 
This categorization is helpful in order to reduce the administrative efforts of the users, because, 
by defining a rule for each category of friends, the system can automatically manage the access to 
new members of this group or to users that can change between categories (e.g., a friend becomes 
a close friend). However, the possibility to define rules for specific individuals is also supported 
by the system. 
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Definition 3: Access levels (AL): The publisher can restrict the access to the contents of her 
publications by defining the allowed level of disclosure of information that is related to a specific 
ST, and by assigning it to each type of contact in CC. Thus, terms in AL define the maximum level 
of information that a reader of a certain CC type can access in any message of the publisher. 
 
Example 1: A user Bob configures his privacy settings related to medical health (that is ST), 
defines access levels AL by specifying terms AL={Disease, Hepatitis}, and classifies her OSN 
friends into the following OSN contact categories CC={close friends, family friends}. Hence, the 
access level AL assigned to close friends is disease, whereas, the level of access for family friends 
is hepatitis. As a result, any publication of Bob that contains information about hepatitis will not 
be completely disclosed to close friends (in fact, they will get a sanitized version of the message, 
as it will be explained in section 6.2.2.2). On the other hand, family friends will get the 
information about hepatitis but not more specific details (e.g., types of hepatitis B, hepatitis C). 
The following rules are generated as a result of these settings. 
 
rule1=<medical health, close friends, ‘diseases’> 
rule2=<medical health, family friends, ‘hepatitis’> 
 
In the following examples, we illustrate the process of rules definition and their enforcement 
by the system. 
 
rule3 ≡ < religion, friends, ‘religion’> 
rule4 ≡ < religion, family friends, ‘Muslim’> 
 
Rule3 restricts friends contacts to get any details of the publisher’s religion (e.g., the publishers 
belief, sect, others), whereas, rule4 permits the family friends to know that the publisher is Muslim, 
but anything more specific will be sanitized. 
 
rule5 ≡ < sexuality, friends, null> 
rule6 ≡ < sexuality, family friends, ‘homosexual’> 
 
In rule5, the level of disclosure for friends is null, that is, friends contacts cannot get any 
information related to the sexual life of the publisher. As a result, any information related to the 
publisher’s sexual life will be sanitized from any publication accessed by friends. In contrast, the 
rule6 permits family friends to know that the publisher is homosexual but nothing more detailed. 
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The previous rules are defined at a conceptual level, as a function of the semantic annotation 
performed by the annotator module. Since the annotation process is also able to detect and classify 
Named Entities (NEs), rules can be also defined in order to protect specific types of NEs (e.g., 
persons, locations, organizations, etc.) that, due to their specificity, may reveal sensitive 
information.  
 
rule7 ≡ < NE_person, strangers, null> 
rule8 ≡ < NE_person, family friends, person_name> 
rule9 ≡ < NE_location, family friends, location_name> 
rule10 ≡ < NE_organization, family friends, organization_name> 
 
Rule7 restricts strangers contacts to get any information that refers to person names. However, 
rule8, rule9 and rule10 permits only family friends contacts to access the specific name of a person, 
a location or an organization mentioned in the publications. 
Notice that, according to the nature of the sensitive topics considered in the requirements, the 
protection will focus on confidential data (e.g., sensitive diseases, sexuality, etc.), thus protecting 
against attribute disclosure, or on identifying data (e.g., person names, locations etc.), thus 
protecting against identity disclosure.  
6.2.2.2 Enforcing Flexible Access Control 
As mentioned in section 6.2.2.1, publishers manage their privacy requirements by assigning a 
level of information disclosure to each contact type. To enforce the appropriate access to sensitive 
data according to such requirements, the publisher’s messages are assessed for sensitiveness 
according to the type of reader that is accessing it. This sensitiveness is determined according to 
the following elements: (i) the contact type of the reader; (ii) their allowed level of disclosure, as 
defined in the rules; (iii) the taxonomy associated to the access level (AL) term and (iv) the 
semantic annotations of the message. The contact type of the reader is evaluated in coherence with 
the privacy requirements of the publisher, in which she categorized her friends in to distinct 
contact categories (CC). According to the contact type of the reader, the rule assigned to them is 
retrieved from the privacy rule repository (which is managed by the social network). As a result, 
the access level (AL) assigned to this contact type is determined from the rule assigned to him. The 
taxonomy associated to access level terms is retrieved from DBPedia. Finally, the annotated 
message of the publisher is retrieved from the annotated content database.  
The system measures the sensitiveness of each term in the message by comparing their 
semantic annotations with the assigned level of access allowed for the reader. To do so, the 
taxonomic branch of assigned access level term is retrieved from DBPedia, in which the top level 
node is the access level (AL) term. As a result, any content that lies under the access level node is 
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considered as sensitive for the reader and it is sanitized (i.e., replaced) with the term that is defined 
in AL, which defines the maximum level of disclosure for that type of reader.       
Example 2: By considering rule1 and rule2 defined in Example 1 (section 6.2.2.1), Bob 
publishes a certain text that contains the term hepatitis. Then, a contact named Alice, who is 
classified as a close friend of Bob tries to access that message. The monitor intercepts the request 
and it checks the rule assigned to the contact type close friend (i.e., rule1) in order to determine the 
level of access for Alice (which is diseases). Then, it retrieves the taxonomy branch related to 
diseases (shown in figure 6.3) from DBPedia and checks that the term hepatitis lies under the AL 
(i.e., diseases). Finally, the monitor sanitizes (i.e., replaces) the term hepatitis by the AL (i.e., 
disease) allowed to Alice and provides this sanitized message to her. 
 
Figure 6.3 Taxonomic generalizations of Hepatitis 
 
6.2.2.3 Policy Conflicts 
In addition to the sanitization of messages, the monitor also handles potential policy conflicts 
within the users. A conflict may appear when the publisher posts a message on another user’s 
timeline or tags another user in her publications, because the message content may refer to the 
latter. To handle the privacy requirements that may apply in such cases, in our system, the users 
(other than the publisher) who are associated with the content of a publication become the co-
publishers of the publication and their privacy rules are also taken into consideration. However, 
the fact that several rules are associated to a message may cause a policy conflict between the 
publisher and the co-publisher(s), because the publisher and co-publisher(s) may define different 
access levels for their types of contacts (e.g., close friends, friends, strangers, etc.). As a result, 
there can be conflicting policies for their contact types. In this situation, in order to fulfill all the 
privacy requirements, the strictest rule amongst those of the publisher and the co-publisher(s) is 
the one that will be applied for their respective contact types. In practice, this means that the 
access level of disclosure that is higher in the taxonomic tree (i.e., the more generic in terms of 
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semantics and, thus, the one that imposes the strictest restriction with regard to term sanitization) 
is the one that will be considered to sanitize the message contents. 
 
Figure 6.4 Access levels defined by Bob and Ted 
Example 3: Extending Example 1 and Example 2 (section 6.2.2.1), Bob tags her friend Ted in a 
publication. As a result, Ted becomes co-publisher of the message. Alice can be a common friend 
or a stranger for Bob or Ted. The access levels defined by Bob and Ted are depicted in figure 6.4. 
 
Accordingly, the following rules are generated as a result of privacy requirements of both 
users. 
 
Rule1-Bob ≡ < medical health, strangers, ‘illness’> 
Rule2-Bob ≡ < medical health, close friends, ‘disease’> 
Rule1-Ted ≡ < medical health, close friends, ‘liver disease’> 
 
In the following cases, we discuss the automatic resolution strategy for the policy conflicts: 
 
Case 1: Alice is a close friend of Bob and Ted  
 
The access request by Alice to Bob’s publication, with Ted as a co-publisher, produces a policy 
conflict; that is, there are two different levels of disclosure for Alice by the publisher and the co-
publisher of the message (i.e., Rule2-Bob and Rule1-Ted). In order to resolve the conflict so that the 
privacy requirements of both Bob and Ted are fulfilled, the monitor retrieves the taxonomic 
branches (show in figure 6.4) of both ALs defined by the publisher and co-publisher (i.e., disease 
and liver disease, respectively) and selects the level that is more general, that is, higher in the 
taxonomic tree. As a result, the level of disclosure disease is chosen by the monitor in order to 
sanitize the message content for Alice. 
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Case 2: Alice is a stranger to Bob and a close friend of Ted 
 
In this case, the level of access for Alice defined by Bob is illness, whereas by Ted it is liver 
disease. By applying the same resolution strategy as above, the sanitization of the content of the 
message will be performed by using illness as access level.       
6.3 Feasibility study 
In this section, we illustrate the practical feasibility of our system by analyzing the scalability of 
its different modules, and show its behavior with an example framed within social network 
specialized in healthcare.   
As already discussed in section 6.2.2.1, it is also important to recall, that the specification of 
the privacy requirements (that would be done just once, during the initialization of their user 
accounts), is the only interaction that the system requires from the user. The rules generated as a 
result of these requirements and the automatic assessment of sensitive information that is driven 
by the semantic annotation will provide the means to enforce a transparent and automatic access 
control over all the subsequent publications. These privacy requirements can be based on the 
sensitive topics (ST) defined in current legislations on data privacy, such as the EU Data 
Protection Act [EU, 1995] (i.e., medical health, religion, race, politics and sexuality), U.S. laws 
on medical data privacy [DoHNY, 2013] (which define lists of sensitive diseases such as HIV, 
hepatitis, sexually transmitted diseases, etc.) or the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [HIPAA, 1996] (which specifies the protection identifying census 
features such as names, locations, etc.). Furthermore, the topics can be chosen according to the 
thematic scope of the OSN. Finally, the access levels (AL) to be defined for each topic would 
match the number of contact categories (CC) in the OSN that is 3, in average, according to 
[Carminati, 2009,2011]. Thus, the definition of privacy requirements requires minimal manual 
efforts by the users. 
To illustrate this, let us compare this with the configuration burden of a standard approach in 
which the users would need to specify the access permission for each publication and contact type. 
To enforce the same level of access control that our system provides in a standard OSN, the user 
would need to: (i) assess the sensitiveness of the contents to be published for every new message; 
(ii) for each message with sensitive contents, create as many sanitized versions of the message as 
contact types with different privacy requirements; and (iii) define the appropriate access control 
rules, so that only allowed contact types can access to the corresponding message. According to 
the Statistics Brain Research Institute [BRI, 2015] and kissmetrics [Kissmetrics, 2015] on average, 
a Facebook user publishes 90 pieces of content per month; from these, around a 58% of the 
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publications require privacy-conscious settings [Liu, 2011]. Thus, users should manually evaluate 
those 90 pieces in order to identify which of them may cause privacy risks and protect the 52 
(90*0.58) pieces that, in average, are sensitive. If we consider an average of 3 contact types, then 
the user would need to create 3*52 message versions and define 3*52 access rules, in the worst 
case. In comparison, in our approach the user only needs to specify as many access levels (AL) as 
contact types (CC) per sensitive topic (ST). If we consider a generic implementation with 6 
sensitive topics (those defined in the EU Data Protection Act plus census-related features), we 
have that the user only needs to define 6*3 AL just once, during the initial configuration step. 
Let us now illustrate the whole process within the context of the sample social network. 
Because of the medical scope of this social network, the privacy protection can be restricted to 
health. Therefore, privacy rules can be configured so that they are related to the health topic. Let 
us also assume that contacts are categorized into the following three groups: 
Clinicians/Researchers, Followers and Registered users. Thus, for privacy rules, the access levels 
(AL) for the contact categories (CC) are related to the different levels of disclosure that may be 
allowed for the medical condition of the user of the SN (which is the sensitive topic (ST). The 
following sets show the customized access levels (AL) and the contact categories (CC) for this 
social network: 
 
AL = {(HIV/AIDS/Hepatitis/STDs), Infections, ill health, Condition/State} 
CC = {(Clinicians/Researcher), Followers, Registered users} 
 
The first elements of AL (i.e., HIV/AIDS/Hepatitis/STDs) correspond to the diseases that are 
considered sensitive by the U.S. federal laws on data privacy [DoHNY, 2013], whereas, the rest of 
the elements are semantically coherent generalizations of the former according to the taxonomic 
structure of DBPedia. 
Once the AL and CC are defined, the user can configure her privacy requirements by assigning 
a specific AL to each element in CC. To do so, the system provides an intuitive interface to define 
her privacy requirements in the form of questions related to the sensitive topics with a list of 
contact categories and a predefined set of taxonomically coherent access levels. Figure 6.5 shows 
an example of the list of AL that can be assigned to each element of CC. 
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Figure 6.5 Privacy requirements of a user in sample social network for the medical health topic 
In this example, the access level for the Clinicians/Researchers group is 
HIV/AIDS/Hepatitis/STDs, whereas, the maximum allowed disclosure for Followers regarding 
these diseases is infections (but not specific diseases) and the Registered users are only allowed to 
know the general notion of ill health, but nothing more specific other than ill health. The 
formalization of these privacy requirements as rule tuples (rulei ≡ < sti, cci, ali>) are as follows: 
 
rule1 = < Medical health, Clinicians/Researchers, HIV > 
rule2 = < Medical health, Clinicians/Researchers, AIDS > 
rule3 = < Medical health, Clinicians/Researchers, Hepatitis > 
rule4 = < Medical health, Clinicians/Researchers, STDs > 
rule5 = < Medical health, Followers, Infections > 
rule6 = < Medical health, Registered users, ill health > 
 
In order to show how these privacy rules are applied in practice, we use the sample message 
shown in figure 6.6, in which a patient shares her personal feelings about her disease (HIV). As 
per privacy requirements, this message is related to the medical health topic (i.e., ST) and is 
sensitive because it contains information about the disease of the publisher. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Sample message to be published 
In order to process the publisher’s messages, the annotator module performs the semantic 
annotation of the messages’ content, as detailed in section 6.2.1. First, the message is syntactically 
analyzed to detect POS (see the output in figure 2.7 that corresponds to the sample message).  
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Figure 6.7 POS tagging of the sample message 
Then, the semantic annotation is performed. Given the number of messages that an OSN is 
expected to receive on daily basis, the scalability of the annotation process is crucial. On the one 
hand, we can consider that the average length of publications in current social networks is 
relatively short and, in some cases, restricted by the number of characters (e.g., Twitter allows 
only 140 characters). On the other hand, our semantic analysis focuses on the noun phrases of the 
publication (marked as NN (singular noun), NNP (proper noun) and NNS (plural noun) in figure 
6.7) and hence, it scales according to the cost of analyzing them. In order to perform the 
annotation, our system derives the semantics of noun phrases by finding their potential 
conceptualizations in DBPedia. For this purpose, SPARQL queries are performed to retrieve the 
possible senses and their corresponding taxonomic structures. Given that, the DBPedia queries are 
the most costly part of the annotation process, the cost of analyzing a message is proportional to 
the time (Tś) required to get the number of senses (nsenses) for each noun phrase within a given 
publication, which is formalized as follows. 
   ( ){ }
1
NPn
senses
i
o TśC st n
=
∝ ∑                                    (6.2) 
A single query is executed for each noun phrase to retrieve any number of senses from the 
knowledge base. Table 6.1 summarizes the actual runtime required to execute SPARQL queries 
with respect to the number of senses of different noun phrases of the message (as shown in figure 
6.6). 
Table 6.1 Time required by a query to get senses of noun phrases 
Noun Phrase No of senses Time (ms) 
HIV 5 0.24 
AIDS 12 0.21 
Thing 54 0.24 
Life 86 0.33 
Virus  100 0.19 
People  12 0.21 
Leper  86 0.33 
 
We can see that the runtime of a SPARQL query is independent of the number of senses of 
each noun phrase, and that the average cost per noun phrase is 0.25ms. In consequence, as we can 
see in figure 6.8 that the runtime of the annotation is linear with regard to the number of noun 
phrases, that is, it scales linearly according to the number and length of the messages to be 
analyzed. 
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Figure 6.8 Runtime of the annotation process w.r.t. the number of noun phrases to analyze 
 
As a result of SPARQL queries, a number of potential senses are retrieved for each noun 
phrase. Table 6.2 shows a list of senses of the noun phrases of the sample message. 
 
Table 6.2 Senses of the noun phrases in the sample message 
HIV LIFE VIRUS AIDS PEOPLE LEPER 
• Sexually_transmitted_diseases (STDs) 
•  HIV 
• Lentiviruses 
• Biological_science  
• Systems 
• Biology 
• Life 
• Viruses  
• Virology 
• Pediatrics 
• Organism 
• Others 
• HIV/AIDS 
• Pandemics 
• Health_disasters 
• Syndromes 
• Humans 
• People_(magazine) 
• Tropical_diseases 
• Leprosy 
• Bacterial_diseases 
• Neglected_diseases 
 
 
As detailed in section 6.2.1, senses need to be semantically disambiguated in order to get the 
appropriate set of senses to get actual semantics of the message. To do so, our system calculates 
the semantic distance of each sense with respect to senses of the other noun phrases according to 
their taxonomic structure in DBpedia (that is retrieved as a result of the previous SPARQL 
queries). For example, let us consider HIV and LIFE nouns appearing in the sample message. The 
semantic distances between their senses are shown in table 6.3 that are calculated according to the 
taxonomies retrieved from DBPedia (which are shown in figure 6.9).  
Table 6.3 Semantic distances between the senses of HIV and LIFE 
LIFE 
  Life System Biology Biological_science  
HIV STDs 0.888 0.937 0.94 0.93 HIV 0.857 0.928 0.93 0.92 
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By performing the same process for all the senses of all the noun phrases, we obtain the set of 
most suitable senses, which are shown in table 6.4. Notice that the disambiguation process does 
not require any additional SPARQL query, but just the pairwise evaluation of already retrieved 
taxonomies. 
Table 6.4 Set of most suitable senses/annotation for the sample message 
HIV LIFE VIRUS AIDS PEOPLE LEPER 
HIV  life Viruses AIDS Humans Leprosy 
 
entity
Abstract 
entity
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state
condition
Pathologic
al state
ill health
Physical 
entity
object
artifact
instrumenti
lity
system
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able 
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being
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cal feature 
knowledge 
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natural 
science
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science
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Figure 6.9 Taxonomic tree of senses for the sample message 
Once the message is annotated and stored, the monitor processes access requests of the readers 
and assesses the sensitiveness of the messages according to the privacy requirements of the 
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publisher (shown in figure 6.5). Eventually, any sense (shown in table 6.4) that lies within the 
branch of access level (that is, a level of disclosure for the contact type of the reader) is considered 
sensitive, and the corresponding noun phrase is sanitized accordingly. In this case, the 
computational cost for the sensitiveness assessment of a message for a specific contact type is 
proportional to the product of number of senses/annotations (nsenses) and the number of nodes (r) in 
a taxonomic branch of the access level corresponding to the contact type:                                          
                                                     
sensesCost n r∝ ×                                          (6.3) 
 
Figure 6.10 DBPedia taxonomies and access levels of the noun phrases in the sample message 
Given the short length of typical messages, the limited amount of contact types and the fact 
that the taxonomies corresponding to the noun phrases have been already retrieved during the 
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annotation stage, the sanitization process is highly scalable. Moreover, the numbers of distinct 
sanitized versions of a message are also limited to the types of contacts and access levels defined 
by the user and, thus, once they are created, they can be cached for further access requests by the 
readers of same contact type.  
Let us illustrate this process for the sample message with respect to the privacy requirements 
(defined in figure 6.5). The sanitization process will be based on the taxonomies retrieved (listed 
in table 6.4) from DBPedia for each annotated noun phrase and the access levels defined for each 
contact type, which are shown in figure 6.10. 
According to rule5, the access level for followers is infections. Therefore, the concepts below 
infection and infectious disease in the taxonomy shown in figure 6.10 (e.g., AIDS, Leprosy and 
HIV) are considered sensitive for followers. Therefore, the corresponding noun phrases need to be 
sanitized in order to fulfill the privacy requirements of the publisher. For this purpose, the 
sensitive noun phrases are replaced with the terms of access level nodes (i.e., infection and 
infectious disease). As a result, the monitor of our system will prepare a sanitized version of a 
message (shown in figure 6.11) for followers, which hides the specific details of the publisher’s 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Sanitized message for followers 
 
Likewise, according to rule6, the access level for registered users is ill health, thus producing 
the sanitized message shown in figure 6.12. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Sanitized message for registered users group 
Finally, according to the first four rules (i.e., rule1 to rule4), the clinicians/researchers can 
access all the details of diseases of the publisher. Consequently, there are no sensitive terms that 
fall under the access level defined for this type of group. Therefore, the information will not be 
sanitized and the members of this group will get the plain text as shown in figure 6.6. 
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6.4 Evaluation 
To complement the feasibility study that mainly considered the scalability of the system from both 
manual and algorithmic sides, in this section we evaluate the accuracy of the semantic annotation 
and the subsequent sensitivity assessment and privacy protection. To do so, we measure and 
evaluate (i) the accuracy of the detection of sensitive terms; and (ii) the accuracy of the semantic 
disambiguation process. 
As evaluation data, we considered a set of entities related to the sensitive topics which are 
covered by current legislations on data privacy (i.e., healthcare data, religion, sexuality and 
location data); we simulated a set of messages to be published (and protected) referring to those 
entities by taking their descriptions in their corresponding Wikipedia articles. Note that, due to the 
highly informative nature of Wikipedia articles describing the entities to be protected, using this 
text as messages to be published represents a very challenging test bed from the perspective of 
document sanitization [Sánchez, 2013b,2014b]. 
As a benchmark for assessing the accuracy of our proposal regarding both sensitive term 
detection and term disambiguation, the collaboration of a human expert was required. More 
specifically, for the first operation, the human expert was asked to manually identify the textual 
terms in the simulated messages that, according to her opinion, unequivocally disclosed the 
underlying entity to be protected with respect to the level of disclosure specified by the user (i.e., 
AL); regarding the second operation, the human expert was asked to manually validate the terms 
that were correctly disambiguated by the system with respect to the senses available in WordNet 
for such terms. According to that judgment, the accuracy of the process for detecting sensitive 
term was quantified in terms of precision, recall and f-measure; while the accuracy of the 
semantic disambiguation process was quantified just in terms of precision.  
Precision, in the first operation, it measures the percentage of automatically identified terms in 
the message (S) that are truly sensitive according to the expert’s opinion (H). A high precision is 
desirable, because it indicates that the system has incurred in a low number of false positives, 
which may unnecessarily hamper the utility and readability of the protected messages. See 
equation (2.4) for a formal representation of precision: 
| | 100S HPrecision
S
∩
= ×                                        (6.4) 
In the second operation, precision is just the percentage of properly disambiguated terms, 
according to the expert’s opinion. In this case, a high precision is desirable in order to replace 
sensitive terms by semantically coherent generalizations. 
On the other hand, recall, which only applies to the first operation, measures the percentage of 
sensitive terms correctly detected by the system (S ∩ H) from the total number of the terms 
detected by the human expert (H). A high recall is desirable because it indicates that the protected 
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message fulfils with the privacy requirements of the user. See equation (2.5) for a formal 
representation of recall: 
| | 100S HRecall
H
∩
= ×
                                            (6.5)       
Finally, f-measure provides the harmonic mean of precision and recall and, thus, summarizes 
the accuracy of the process in charge of detecting sensitive terms in the messages to be published. 
See equation (2.6) for formal representation of f-measure:  
2 Recall PrecisionF measure
Recall Precision
× ×
− =
+
                          (6.6) 
Evaluation results that show the accuracy of the sensitive term detection process are depicted 
in table 6.5. To evaluate the effect of the configuration of the privacy requirements, each entity has 
been protected and evaluated (by the human expert) for two access levels (AL) with different 
degrees of generality.  
Table 6.5 Evaluation results for the process in charge of detecting sensitive terms 
Entity/ 
Wikipedia  
article 
 
Related ST 
# 
words 
in text 
# noun 
phrase
s 
Access  
Level 
 
H 
 
S 
 
Recall 
 
Precision 
 
F-
measure 
HIV Health 49 20 Condition 9 7 77.77 % 100 % 87 % Infection 4 3 75 %    100 % 85 % 
Christianity Religion 66 22 Belief 10 9 90 % 100 % 94 % Religion 7 5 71 %    100 % 83 % 
Homosexu-
ality 
Sexual 
orientation 
78 26 Process 6 6 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Sexual 
activity 
5 4 80 %    100 % 88 % 
Berlin Census data 105 31 Location 10 8 80 % 100 % 88 % City 3 3 100 %    100 % 100 % 
 
In all cases, the system achieves perfect precision because, as stated in the privacy 
requirements, it sanitizes terms that are semantic specializations of the entities defined as access 
levels; thus, by definition, all the detected terms that may disclose the entity must be protected. On 
the other hand, recall figures fluctuated between 71-100%, showing that there is still room for 
improvement. Indeed, according to the expert assessment, some combinations of terms that are not 
actual specializations of the entity to be protected, but that can be related on some way with it, 
may also enable disclosure and should be adequately protected. For example, an informed attacker 
may infer that a publisher suffers from a certain sensitive disease from the fact that specific 
treatments or symptoms are mentioned in a discourse, despite of the fact that the disease has been 
already sanitized in the published message and that those terms are not specializations of the 
former. We are currently working on this issue and we provide some insights on how to tackle it in 
the next section. Finally, we can also see that the recall (i.e., the accuracy of the privacy 
protection) tends to increase as more general terms are defined as ALs. Indeed, a more general AL 
will impose a stronger restriction and force the system to sanitize more terms and, thus, the 
outcome would tend to offer a more robust protection. 
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Regarding the accuracy achieved by the semantic disambiguation process, table 6.6 shows the 
evaluation results that have been obtained. As it has been previously explained, in this case the 
human expert just validates the terms that have been correctly disambiguated by the proposed 
system according to the senses available for such terms in WordNet. Results reflect that, on 
average, the scheme disambiguated 66% of the terms correctly; even though this value may seem 
on the low side, it is coherent with the state of the art in semantic disambiguation [Kilgarriff, 
2000], which rarely achieves very high precision figures. Moreover, improperly disambiguated 
terms would only affect the semantic coherence of the protected message, but not the privacy of 
the user, which is our main goal. 
Table 6.6 Evaluation results for the process in charge of disambiguating terms 
Entity/ 
Wikipedia 
article 
 
Related ST 
 
Access 
Level 
 
H 
 
S 
 
Precisio
n 
HIV Health Condition 7 4 57 % 
Infection 3 2 66 % 
Christianity Religion Belief 9 5 55 % 
Religion 5 3 60 % 
Homosexuality Sexual 
orientation 
Process 6 4 66 % 
Sexual 
activity 
4 2 50 % 
Berlin Census data Location 8 6 75 % 
City 3 3 100 % 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we proposed a privacy-preserving content-driven access control mechanism for 
textual publications in the context of social media. Contrary to existing solutions [Masoumzadeh, 
2010b] [Carminati, 2009,2011], the proposal is content driven in the sense that the semantics of 
the messages are automatically assessed by relying on an ontological knowledge base in order to 
detect the sensitive information they contain according to the privacy requirements of the 
publishers. These requirements are defined in general (i.e., an allowed level of disclosure is 
defined for the different contact types defined in a given environment), and the publications whose 
contents are related to these requirements are automatically protected. To do so, the sensitive 
information is sanitized and different versions of the publication are generated according to the 
access level of the readers. Thus, the privacy enforcement is transparent both to the publishers and 
readers, thus requiring no administrative efforts at the publication time, contrary to most related 
works [Carminati, 2009,2011]. In addition, the proposed mechanism is flexible enough to be 
incorporated in any scenario that publishes messages and classifies contacts into categories. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future work 
 
 
 
7.1 Summary 
The main goal of this thesis was to tackle the privacy issues inherent to the information exchange 
in open and distributed environments, by proposing privacy-preserving access control solutions 
that could alleviate the limitations of the existing solutions.  
To achieve this goal, we faced a number of challenges. First, we need to deal with large 
number of heterogeneous entities involved in open scenarios and their diverse (and dynamically 
changing) privacy requirements. Moreover, in order to propose a feasible and scalable solution, we 
need to get rid of manual management of rules/constraints (in which most available solutions rely) 
that constitutes a serious burden for the users and the administrators. Finally, access control 
management should be intuitive for the end users, who usually lack technical expertise, and they 
may find access control mechanism more difficult to understand and rigid to apply due to its 
complex configuration settings. We tackled these challenges by means of the following 
contributions: 
• Most of the existing works propose scenario-specific solutions aiming to alleviate the 
limitations of standard access control models. In contrast, we proposed a generic 
ontology-based solution that can potentially model entities and policies of any scenario. 
Our ontology-based solution is inspired in the ABAC paradigm and, at its backbone, it 
Ontology-based Access Control in Open Scenarios 
82 
 
models the generic subject, object and policy entities, which can be easily extended to 
accommodate the specificities of concrete scenarios. Moreover, the generic design of our 
ontology allows defining access rules at different levels of abstraction; that is, from 
concrete instances or classes to the most general/abstract classes in the ontology. In the 
latter case, and thanks to the ontological inference enabled by the taxonomic structure of 
entities modeled in the ontology, the system can automatically enforce rules for the more 
specific entities. The applicability and extensibility of our ontology has been illustrated in 
two paradigmatic open scenarios: OSNs and the cloud. 
• We further extended our generic ontology to propose a delegation enforcement 
mechanism by enhancing the capabilities of XACML delegation profile (in terms of 
scalability and performance) by means of an ontology-based modeling of the delegation 
workflow. As a result, the delegation, verification and revocation processes are managed 
in a way that they can be easily adapted to the large scale environments (e.g., cloud) 
where entities are numerous, heterogeneous and distributed. With our approach, policies 
are modeled in the ontology and linked to the entities to which they refer. In this way, we 
do not incur in the overhead of searching for policy/entity matching in a potentially large 
database; as shown both theoretically and in practice, this significantly increases the 
performance of the system. Moreover, the proposed algorithms automatically enforce and 
resolve policy conflicts through the delegation workflow, without requiring the definition 
of special rules. The proposed system is also capable of detecting forge identities by 
relying on policies digitally signed by the owners of the resources. 
• We also proposed a privacy-driven access control mechanism for textual resources that is 
able to enforce access control rules over the resources according to the sensitiveness of 
their contents. By relying on the formal domain knowledge modeled in ontological 
knowledge bases, our proposed system is able to automatically detect pieces of 
information that are sensitive according to the privacy requirements of the user. 
Moreover, the user may define different access/disclosure level on her own sensitive data 
according to the trust she has on the others. According to this, the system sanitizes the 
sensitive content and prepares different versions of textual resources according to the 
access levels of the readers. This offers a much more flexible (and transparent) 
mechanism than the manually defined and binary access control models usually 
implemented in environments such as OSNs. Due to the automatic management and 
enforcement of privacy configurations, our system requires no administrative efforts by 
the users at the time of publishing/resealing sensitive contents. 
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7.2 Publications 
The contributions of this thesis have been published or submitted for publication to the following 
venues: 
Conferences: 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2016), Ontology-based Access Control Management: 
Two Use Cases, in:  Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Agents and Artificial 
Intelligence, Rome, Italy, pp. 244-249. Core Rank: C 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2015), Ontology-Based Delegation of Access Control: 
An Enhancement to the XACML Delegation Profile, in: Proceedings of the 12th 
International Conference, TrustBus 2015, Valencia, Spain, September 1-2, 2015, 
Proceedings, Springer International Publishing, pp. 18-29. Core Rank: B 
JCR Indexed Journals: 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, (2016), Privacy-driven access control in social 
networks by means of automatic semantic annotation, in: Computer Communications, 76, 
2016, pp. 12-25. (Published) Impact Factor-2014: 1.695 (1st Quartile, Computer Science-
Information Systems) 
• Imran-Daud M, Sánchez D, Viejo A, Ontology-based Access Control Delegation 
Enforcement for the Cloud, in: Security and Communication Networks. (Under Review) 
Impact Factor-2014: 0.72 (2nd Quartile, Computer Networks and Communications). 
7.3 Future Work 
In this section, we give some lines for future research that derive from the work developed in this 
thesis, and also provide some ideas to tackle them. Regarding thegenericaccess control ontology, 
following lines can be considered: 
• We plan to study the interoperability issues that arise in access control between 
heterogeneous systems and evaluate whether our ontology-based mechanism (with its 
common ontological backbone, which offer a common modeling for the entities involved 
in different systems) may provide a suitable solution to interoperate between rules and 
entities of different scenarios. 
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• The backbone of our generic ontology is inspired in the ABAC paradigm, thus, access 
control is managed based on the attributes of the entities. However,  ABAC does not 
support constraints specification [Coyne, 2013]; for example, when we want to constrain 
delegation privileges with date and time or with a valid registration. Such constrains are 
supported in the RBAC paradigm through the roles (which contain role names, constrains 
and permissions). As future work, we can extend our ontology to support constraints 
specification by incorporating role as an attribute. However, ABAC can only constrain 
role names (which are stored as an attribute) but not the role with the associated 
permissions. For this purpose, we need to find a solution to manage the roles modeled in 
the ontology and also devise methods to constrain the specifications of attributes. 
Existing solutions [Damiani, 2005, Bijon, 2013] proposed for open environments can be 
considered to incorporate constraints in our ontology-based mechanism. 
• The delegation model presented in chapter 5 is an enhancement of the XACML profile, 
which is able to improve the performance of the policy search for each access request by 
relying on the ontology-based workflow. To apply this improvement in practice we 
require modifying the architecture of XACML (shown in figure 2.1) in order to support 
our ontological framework. To do so, the XACML architecture can be extended with the 
modules (in addition to the actors explained in section 2.3.1) that are responsible for (i) 
retrieving information of entities from the ontology and (ii) verifying the delegation from 
the certification authority. In addition, the procedures of the XACML actors need to be 
redefined in order synchronize them with ontological procedures and the proposed 
algorithms. 
Regarding the content-driven privacy-preserving access control mechanism, the following lines of 
research can be defined for further improvement: 
• In order to alleviate users from completely specifying their privacy requirements, we will 
consider the automatic inference of access control rules according to the social 
relationships implemented in the social web (e.g., In OSNs, the privacy rules for friends 
could be same for the friends of friend). At this respect, a machine learning approach 
[Bilogrevic, 2013] can also be considered to semi-automatize the configuration of privacy 
rules. 
• The user’s privacy can also be compromised by the (co-)occurrence of information that is 
correlated to the sensitive topic to be protected. For example, even though a user may 
publish a message that does not directly references the disease she suffer from, the 
message may contain combinations of terms (such as treatment, symptoms or drugs) that 
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may enable to univocally inferring such sensitive disease. We are currently working on 
automatic solutions to address this issue that, in a nutshell, would assess the disclosure 
that potentially correlated terms (e.g., symptoms) may produce for a sensitive one (e.g., a 
sensitive disease) according to their mutual information, which is computed from the 
information distribution of data in large corpora [Sánchez, 2013b,2014b,a, Sánchez, 
2016a]. We plan to incorporate them to the developed in order to improve the assessment 
of privacy risks by detecting correlated terms or term aggregations that may disclose 
more information about a sensitive topic than the one specified in the privacy rules. 
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